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Article
The Implications for Law of User
Innovation
William W. Fisher Illt
Today, most consumer goods are mass produced, not cus-
tom made. If you want a pair of shoes, you go to a shoe store
and purchase them "off the rack"; you don't go to a tailor to
have them made to fit your feet or your walking habits. If you
want a book, you buy a copy of one already published; you don't
hire an author to write one. There are exceptions to be sure;
some people still have suits or dresses made especially for
them. But the exceptions are rare.
For as long as this has been true, some consumers have
been altering the mass-produced products they purchase. Re-
cently, the frequency of this behavior has increased sharply.
The producers of some products welcome innovation by users,
but the producers of others are trying to control or prevent it.
Producers whose wishes are defied by consumers are turn-
ing increasingly to the courts. The responses of the courts have
been inconsistent. Sometimes they have come to the producers'
aid; sometimes they have refused. Both sides claim that they
are being treated unfairly and seek changes in the law that
would strengthen their positions.
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This Article tries to help lawmakers in deciding how to re-
spond to these competing requests. The analysis proceeds as
follows: Part I documents the increasingly common practice of
user innovation. Part II identifies the characteristics shared by
its many manifestations. Part III surveys the variety of ways in
which producers have reacted to this conduct. Part IV examines
the legal doctrines that are currently used to resolve conflicts
between producers and innovators. Part V, the longest portion
of the Article, tests the claims of producers and users against
several normative criteria. Part VI returns to the law, suggest-
ing some specific reforms that would advance the most convinc-
ing of the policy arguments examined in Part V.
I. USERS' BEHAVIOR
The phenomena with which we are concerned are best de-
scribed by example. Let's start with modifications of cultural
goods. These will be familiar to most readers, so we can canvass
them quickly.
Digital mashups are created by combining audio, video,
graphical, or textual material from preexisting works into new
digital works.' A classic in this genre is The Grey Album, 2
created in 2004 by Brian Burton (better known as Danger
Mouse), which integrated material from the Beatles's The
White Album with rapper Jay-Z's The Black Album.3 Widely
circulated on the Internet, it received favorable reviews in The
New Yorker,4 Rolling Stone,5 Entertainment Weekly,6 and The
Village Voice.7 Laurent Fauchere and Antoine Tinguely subse-
quently combined a portion of The Grey Album with excerpts
1. The most thorough study of the practice, culture, and economics of
making mashups is LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE
THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY 1-19, 68-76 (2008).
2. DANGER MOUSE, THE GREY ALBUM (2004).
3. For discussions of some of the legal implications of Danger Mouse's
work, see MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVO-
LUTION: HANDS OFF MY IPOD 130-34 (2007); Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty
Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345,
349-50 (2008).
4. Ben Greenman, The Mouse that Remixed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004,
at 24.
5. Lauren Gitlen, DJ Makes Jay-Z Meet Beatles, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 5,
2004, http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5937152/dj-makesjayz-meet
beatles.
6. David Browne, Clash of the Titans, ENT. WKLY., Mar. 19, 2004, at 64.
7. Douglas Wolk, Mother Nature's Son, I Got 99 Problems But a Glass
Onion, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 18-24, 2004, at 86.
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from the Beatles' movie, A Hard Day's Night, and a video re-
cording of a rap performance by Jay-Z to create the popular
Grey Video.8
Some mashups are parodies; they poke fun at one or more
of the works that they draw upon. Examples include Soder-
berg's Read My Lips, which mocks the close relationship be-
tween George W. Bush and Tony Blair,9 Jason Woliner's Spec-
Attack-ular, which mocks John Ashcroft's alarmist and parti-
san response to terrorist threats,10 and Shining, an unautho-
rized trailer that combines excerpts from the movie with a song
by Peter Gabriel in a way that makes the famous horror film
seem a feel-good romance." Others draw upon existing works,
not to comment upon them, but for independent artistic objec-
tives.12
Typically, mashups are fixed in a digital format and then
made available for public listening, viewing, or downloading on
the Internet. Thousands-most of them created by amateurs-
can be found on YouTube. 13 Recently, however, organizations
like Eclectic Method have begun making mashups spontaneous-
ly and performing them in clubs. Some of these "live" mashups
seek to respond to the mood and even incorporate the behavior of
the audience. 14
Artists working in nondigital media also commonly incor-
porate preexisting mass-produced works. Sculptures (such as
Jeff Koons's String of Puppies),15 collages (such as Koons's Nia-
gara), 16 paintings (such as Joy Garnett's Stones),17 and litho-
8. See The Grey Video, http://waxy.org/randomlvideo/grey-video.mov
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
9. See Bush and Blair: Read My Lips, http://video.google.com/videoplay?
docid=3580315324203381023# (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). For a description
and analysis of the work, see LESSIG, supra note 1, at 73-74.
10. See Spec-Attack-Ular, http://aspecialthing.ningcom/video/video/show?
id=1978181:Video: 1682 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
11. See Shining, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfout-rgPSA (last vi-
sited Apr. 11, 2010).
12. See, e.g., Vader Sessions, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-6AOrw
G39Jzk (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
13. See, e.g., Christian Bale Takes David to the Dentist, http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v-70r-Ca8wcVg (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Lady Gaga
vs. Christopher Walken-Poker Face, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-nGH5
ygIKyTO (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Tick-Toxic, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gRHfd9YtoOA (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
14. The website for Eclectic Method, http://www.eclecticmethod.net (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010), provides a helpful explanation of this new approach.
15. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303-05 (2d Cir. 1992).
16. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006).
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graphs (such as Shepard Fairey's Obama Hope poster)18 often
either are based upon or integrate other images. Thousands of
less famous works employ similar techniques.' 9
Edits of movies consist, as the name suggests, of abridged
versions of commercially released films. Some are prepared and
distributed by companies catering to niche markets-for exam-
ple, consumers less tolerant of violence or nudity than most
moviegoers. 20 Others are prepared by amateurs who believe (of-
ten with good reason) that they can improve films by removing
scenes or characters. For instance, several edits of Star Wars,
Episode I: The Phantom Menace have been created and made
available over the Internet. 21 Unlike mashups, which are most
often intended to be humorous, movie edits usually represent
serious efforts to strengthen the originals. 22
Narrowly defined, fan fiction consists of stories that place
characters from popular works (such as Captain Kirk and
Spock from the television show and movie series Star Trek) in
novel settings.23 More broadly defined, it consists of "any kind
of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of
17. See John Armitage & Joy Garnett, Radicalizing Refamiliarization, 8
J. VISUAL CULTURE 176, 180-81 (2009). For many additional examples, see
Famous Painters Copied Photographs, http://www.fogonazos.es/ 20 0 6/11/
famous-painters-copied-photographs 06.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
18. See Armitage & Garnett, supra note 17, at 177-78. Full disclosure:
after I presented the lectures embodying this Article, I agreed to represent
Shepard Fairey in the lawsuit in which the Associated Press contends that his
unauthorized use of an AP photograph constitutes copyright infringement. See
Melena Rizik, Shepard Fairey Wins Right to a New Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2009, at C2. Although I formulated the arguments presented herein before
I became involved in the litigation, it is possible that my engagement in the
case has affected the final version of this Article.
19. See, e.g., Collage Art, http://www.collageart.org/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2010) (cataloguing international artists employing collage techniques).
20. See, e.g., Clean Play DVDs, http://www.cleanplaydvds.com (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010) (selling sanitized versions of popular movies); cf. Clean Flicks of
Colo. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1244 (D. Colo. 2006) (granting in-
junctive relief to several motion picture studios for copyright infringement by
Clean Flicks and other companies engaged in editing out sexual and violent
content from movies and then selling them).
21. The most widely circulated of those modified versions, 'The Phantom
Edit," is available at http://www.torrentz.com/2ce660814fl9e909el5bbb96ad43
a82335892926 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
22. See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 28-29 (2004).
23. Aaron Schwabach, The Harry Potter Lexicon and the World of Fan-
dom: Fan Fiction, Outsider Works, and Copyright, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 387,
388-91 (2009); Paul Constant, Where No Man Has Gone Before, NEWSWEEK,
May 5, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/195963.
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popular culture, such as a television show, and is not produced
as 'professional' writing."24 Writing of this sort has been pro-
duced for centuries, but as a recognized genre, fan fiction seems
to have originated in the United States in the late 1960s. 25 (A
parallel genre, known as doujinshi, emerged in Japan at ap-
proximately the same time.26) In recent years, the ability of fan-
fiction writers to share their creations with fellow fans over the
Internet has amplified its popularity enormously.27
Among the many subgenres of fan fiction is "Mary Sue fic-
tion." Stories of this sort rewrite famous narratives either by
bringing a minor character to the fore or by inserting an entire-
ly new character-typically a stand-in for the author.28 Another
flourishing subgenre is known as "slash fiction." These stories,
typically written by women, place well-known, male fictional
characters (often drawn from science fiction) in homoerotic set-
tings.29 A recent, even more controversial, variation on this
theme is "real person slash." Stories in this vein depict famous
living people-almost always men; usually athletes, actors, or
musicians-engaged in homosexual relationships or encoun-
ters.30
A final example: purchasers of computer games routinely
modify them. A growing percentage of game manufacturers,
24. Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
Common Law, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (1997). See generally KAREN
HELLEKSON & KRISTINA BUSSE, FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE
AGE OF THE INTERNET: NEW ESSAYS (2006).
25. See Tushnet, supra note 24, at 655 (tracing the genre's origin to the
second season of Star Trek in 1967).
26. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECH-
NOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 25-
28 (2004).
27. Many such communities can be found at Fan Fiction, http://www
.fanfiction.net/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010), or Archive of Our Own, http://
archiveofourown.org/media (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
28. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Everyone's a Superhero: A
Cultural Theory of "Mary Sue" Fan Fiction as Fair Use, 95 CAL. L. REV. 597,
598-601 (2007).
29. See HENRY JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS: TELEVISION FANS AND PAR-
TICIPATORY CULTURE 187-89 (1992); Sonia K. Katyal, Performance, Property,
and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 461,
481-97 (2006).
30. See Andrew Furlow, A Glimpse into the Lawless World of "Real Per-
son Slash" (May 15, 2009) (unpublished paper, on file with the author). One
might fairly ask: is it accurate to describe stories of this last sort as involving
the appropriation or modification of preexisting cultural products? Response:
yes, at least to the extent that the personae of the persons depicted therein
can plausibly be described as "constructed."
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aware of consumers' tastes for customization, provide them
"toolkits," which facilitate the process of creating new fea-
tures. 31 Many players, however, find the commercial toolkits
inadequate and develop their own. Players of The Sims, a com-
plex and popular game, are especially innovative. Some of the
features they create are simple-for example, new colors for the
games' characters. Others are more complex-for example, new
types of furniture that can be used to decorate the artificial
worlds produced in the game. Still others are highly sophisti-
cated-for example, a system that enables the games' charac-
ters to vote on issues.32 Most of the customizers share their in-
novations with other players, usually through the Internet.
Notably, the more sophisticated an innovation, the more likely
it is to be shared.33 Demand for customized features is high;
some of the most complex user innovations have been down-
loaded more than 100,000 times.34
In recent years, these and other ways of modifying cultural
products have become extraordinarily popular. John Palfrey
and Urs Gasser, for example, report that roughly one in four
young people now engage in "remixing" digital content into
their own artistic creations. 35 It is not surprising that this
trend has attracted considerable attention-both among mem-
bers of the public and among legal scholars. Less familiar, es-
pecially to legal scholars, are types of user innovation that in-
31. See Celia Pearce, Emergent Authorship: The Next Interactive Revolu-
tion, 26 COMPUTER & GRAPHICS 21, 26-28 (2002); Lars Bo Jeppesen, The Im-
plications of "User Toolkits for Innovation" 3 (Copenhagen Bus. Sch., Working
Paper 2002), available at http://www.druid.dk/conferences/summer2003/papers/
JEPPESEN.pdf. One study found that, in a sample of ninety-four computer
games, thirty-five percent made such toolkits available to users. Lars Bo Jep-
pesen & MAns J. Molin, Consumers as Co-Developers: Learning and Innova-
tion Outside the Firm, 15 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 363, 367
(2003). "Toolkits in practice with computer games range from what are called
level builders (which allow players to create their own game environments) to
character-building kits (which enable users to create individual avatars).
Some games even provide users with the code or scripting language to create
their own games." Reinhard Priigl & Martin Schreier, Learning from Leading-
Edge Customers at The Sims: Opening up the Innovation Process Using Tool-
kits, 36 R&D MGMT. 237, 240 (2006).
32. Prigl & Schreier, supra note 31, at 243-44.
33. Id. at 246.
34. Id.
35. See JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING
THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 113 (2008).
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volve more tangible products.36 Illustrative instances are de-
scribed below.
Purchasers of sports equipment frequently alter the
equipment to fit their bodies or needs. For instance, as Eric von
Hippel has shown, the modifications of windsurfers that enable
them to be used for jumping and other high-performance ma-
neuvers were originally made by users and only later adopted
by manufacturers. 37 Similarly, many innovations in the rapidly
developing field of kite surfing (for example, the shapes of the
boards and the mechanisms for releasing kites in emergencies)
have been made by the surfers themselveS38-and then shared
with other surfers through blogs. 39 Rock and ice climbers are
constantly modifying their equipment. For instance, the "leash-
es" that enable ice climbers to hang onto their ice axes and ice
hammers when climbing frozen waterfalls were originally de-
signed by climbers and only later incorporated by the axe and
hammer manufacturers. 40 The same is true of Big Bro chocks
and many other forms of "protection" employed by rock climb-
ers.41 Snowboarders and rodeo kayakers engage in similar le-
vels of innovation. 42 Fly fishermen have the same penchant for
36. An important exception to legal scholars' disinterest in this phenome-
non is Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent
Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008). Part V takes up Strandburg's sug-
gestions concerning how legal doctrine might be adjusted to accommodate be-
havior of this sort.
37. See ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 1-2 (2005).
38. See Nikolaus Franke et al., Finding Commercially Attractive User In-
novations: A Test of Lead- User Theory, 23 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 301,
309 tbl.4 (2006). The nature and scale of the sport are sketched in the follow-
ing passage:
Kite surfing is a water sport in which the user stands on a special
board, somewhat like a surfboard, and is pulled along by holding onto
a large, steerable kite. Equipment and technique have evolved to the
point that kites can be guided both with and against the wind by a
skilled kite surfer and can lift rider and board many meters into the
air for tens of seconds at a time. Today there are between 100,000 and
250,000 kite surfers worldwide.
Id. at 305.
39. See, e.g., Kite Forum, http://www.kiteforum.comlblogs.php (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010).
40. Photographs of some of the original amateur leashes and some modern
commercial versions can be found at http:/cyber.law.harvard.edulpeople/tfisher/
Ice%20Axe%20Leashes.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
41. See Cameron Cross, Craig Luebben (1960-2009), CLIMBING, Oct. 2009,
at 68, 68.
42. See Carliss Baldwin et al., How User Innovations Become Commercial
Products: A Theoretical Investigation and Case Study, 35 RES. POL'Y 1291,
1294-96 (2006); Christoph Hienerth, The Commercialization of User Innova-
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tinkering. Some modify their rods, for example, by using fine
sandpaper to remove the sheen from new graphyite rods, thereby
reducing the chance that the fish will be spooked by reflected
sunlight. Many tie their own flies, creating new patterns, and
then posting those patterns to fly-fishing Internet sites.43
A surprisingly active zone of user innovation is basketball
shoes. As Johann Filler and his colleagues have shown, huge
numbers of basketball players participate in online communi-
ties.44 The most popular of the fora, Niketalk, has 34,000 mem-
bers and receives 5000 posts a day.4 5 A substantial percentage
of those contributions discuss modifications of basketball
shoes.46 Some of these changes are aesthetic (the addition of
paint, glitter, or other decorations); others are functional. Most
involve modest adjustments to existing designs, but a few offer
detailed plans for entirely new designs.47
Another field characterized by high levels of user innova-
tion is bicycling. For decades, racing cyclists have been modify-
ing their machines in quest of optimum performance. Less well-
known are the myriad ways in which bicycles are modified in
developing countries for more prosaic purposes. Many such in-
novations can be found on the remarkable website: AfriGad-
get.4 8 For example, bicycles are often customized to enable
them to carry large loads or to serve as ambulances. 49 Other
innovations are more ingenious. For example, one man added
tions: The Development of the Rodeo Kayak Industry, 36 R&D MGMT. 273, 285-
88 (2006); Sonali K. Shah, From Innovation to Firm Formation in the Wind-
surfing, Skateboarding, and Snowboarding Industries 9-21 (Univ. of Ill. Work-
ing Paper No. 05-0107, 2004), available at http://apps.olin.wustl.edulfaculty/
conferences/cres-gort/pdfl6SonaliShah.pdf. Rodeo kayakers perform flips,
spins, aerobic maneuvers, and other tricks in white water. A representative
video of these activities is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-xx
WsvolnLw8 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
43. See, e.g., Flyfishing Fly Swap, http://about-flyfishing.com/library/
weekly/aa020100a.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); HipWader's Fly Fishing
Forums and Fly Tying Message Board, http://flyfishingforums.hipwader.com/
viewforum.php?id=7 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
44. See Johann Filler et al., Innovation Creation by Online Basketball
Communities, 60 J. BUS. RES. 60, 63-70 (2007).
45. See id. at 63 tbl.1.
46. See id. at 64-68.
47. See id. at 67 fig.2 (describing one such comprehensive proposal, con-
tributed by Vocaldigital23 to the Niketalk forum).
48. See AfriGadget, http://www.afrigadget.com/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2010).
49. See AfriGadget, Retrofit Turns a Bicycle to an 'Ambulance,' http://
www.afrigadget.com/2009/07/29/retrofit-turns-a-bicycle-to-an-ambulance/ (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
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several features to his bicycle enabling it both to carry and to
power a knife sharpening system.50 In the most famous of these
instances of modern-day bricolage, William Kamkwamba of
Malawi used the frame, chain, and rear wheel of a bicycle
(along with some PVC pipe and a tractor fan) to provide the
heart of a windmill that drives a small generator used to
charge cellular telephones in a region lacking electric power.51
Cellular phones themselves represent another area of in-
tense user innovation. For example, many purchasers of Apple
iPhones have developed applications that either improve upon
or supplement the limited set of applications that Apple pro-
vides. Instinctiv Shuffle, for instance, replaces the Shuffle sys-
tem associated with the iPod component of the phone. Its key
feature provides you a collection of songs that, instead of being
drawn at random from your entire collection, fit your current
mood and activity by analyzing the songs you skip.52 Thou-
sands of other unauthorized applications have been developed
for the iPhone and are readily available on the Internet.53
Cooks, both amateur and professional, also innovate fre-
quently. Recipes, of course, are constantly being tweaked. Less
well known is the tendency of cooks to invent or adapt tools,
enabling them to improve their concoctions or make them fast-
er. Examples include: pantyhose liners for strainers, which are
then used to create smooth sauces; paint rollers wrapped with
tea towels, used to apply oil to grills; segments of curtain rods
used as mandrels for phyllo straws; and cedar shingles, soaked
in water, used to roast salmon. 54
50. A video demonstrating the system can be found at http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v-9bxPkNIfK4 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
51. The windmill is depicted and described at AfriGadget, Homemade
Windmill in Malawi, http://www.afrigadget.com/2006/12/18/homemade-windmill
-in-malawi/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). For more about Kamkwamba's back-
ground and inventions, see generally WILLIAM KAMKWAMBA & BRYAN MEA-
LER, THE BOY WHO HARNESSED THE WIND (2009).
52. Instinctiv Shuffle is described-and can be obtained for free-at http://
www.appleiphoneschool.com/2009/01/13/instinctiv-shuffle-an-ipod (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010).
53. See, e.g., Robert Mullins, Unauthorized iPhone Apps Market Flourish-
es, PC WORLD, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/1377661
unauthorizediphone.appsmarketflourishes.html; iPhone Hacks, http://
www.iphonehacks.comiphone-applications/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (chro-
nicling unauthorized applications).
54. See Amanda Hesser, Quick, Hide the Tools. Here Comes a Chef, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at Fl.
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Boats constitute another arena of intense user innovation.
The owners of recreational motorboats and sailboats are con-
stantly customizing their crafts to enhance speed, safety, or
convenience. Boating magazines and websites, such as Sail and
Cruising World, commonly feature designs and gear that can be
used for these purposes.55 More interesting for our purposes are
the ideas for customization developed by the boat owners them-
selves. Such ideas are often shared informally among friends,
among competitors at regattas, or when boat owners wander
the docks at marinas, admiring others' crafts. The owners and
operators of commercial boats are even more likely to modify
them to suit their purposes. A review of the advertisements for
used "sternpickers" (gillnet boats employed to catch salmon in
the Pacific Northwest) or lobsterboats (employed primarily in
Northern New England and Eastern Canada) reveals an ex-
traordinary array of adjustments and innovations.56
Motorcycle owners also tend to be innovative. The owners
of Harley Davidsons, in particular, are especially likely to cus-
tomize their bikes. Various independent companies offer "kits"
that can be used to make those modifications,57 but many own-
ers go much further than the kits allow. The website for the
Harley Owners Group contains a forum in which members can
exchange customization ideas and plans.58 Many motorcycles
55. See, e.g., Cruising World, Gear and Systems, http://www.cruisingworld
.com/gear-and-systems.jsp (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); eHow, How to Custom-
ize Your Boat for Lake Fishing, http://www.ehow.com/how 2031813
customize-boat-fishing.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Piragis Boundary Wa-
ters Catalogue, Customizing Your Boat, http://www.boundarywaterscatalog
.com/browse.cfm/2,116.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
56. See Athearn Marine Agency, Lobster Boats, http://www.athearnmarine
.com/veslLobster_1.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (offering lobster boats with
a variety of lengths and engine power); BoatQuest.com, Lobster New & Used
Boats for Sale, http://www.boatquest.com/Lobster/l/allcategoryboats.aspx (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010) (advertising a variety of lobster boat models); Permit
Master, Gillnet Combos, http://www.permitmaster.com/boat-1istings.php?list
type-cat&catid=10 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (offering gillnet boats with such
modifications as new reduction gears, hydraulic pumps, and helm pumps).
57. See, e.g., AME Chopper Products, http://www.ame-chopper.de/Seiten
USA/AOO index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (promoting a variety of prod-
ucts used to construct and modify choppers); AR Harley & Sons, http://
www.harleycustom.com/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (presenting custom motor-
cycle parts, including those designed for European models); Team Cycle USA
Motorcycle Kit Specialist, http://www.teamcycle.com/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2010) (advertising kits, parts and accessories for custom-made Harley David-
sons and other chopper brands).
58. See Harley Owners Group, http://www.hog.com (last visited Apr. 11,
2010) (offering Harley Owners Group members a variety of benefits, including
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that have undergone this process are available for sale on the
Internet. 59
Cars, similarly, seem to cry out for customization. For
many years, of course, young men (and occasionally women)
have been tinkering with cars, usually in efforts to make them
go faster.60 An especially intriguing subset of modified cars is
known as lowriders. These consist of classic American cars
(1964 Chevrolet Impalas are especially prized) whose suspen-
sions have been modified to make them ride even closer to the
ground than they originally did.61 Often, their shock absorbers
have been replaced with hydraulic devices that can be con-
trolled independently by the driver. 62 Cars altered in this way
can be made to dance. 63 Lowriders were originally confined to
the Chicano community in Los Angeles, but have since become
popular among the youth in many cities in the southwestern
United States.64
Woodworkers, both amateur and professional, are con-
stantly altering their tools to make them more precise, effi-
cient, and flexible. Large power tools, in particular, can usually
be improved with custom-made accessories. Common additions
include: extensions for table saws,65 tables and fences for radial
access to customization advice); see also Gil McWilliam, Building Stronger
Brands Through Online Communities, 41 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 43, 44
(2000) (noting that Harley Davidson created its respectable owners' group in
response to the notoriety the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang received for their
outlaw behavior).
59. See, e.g., AutaBuy, http://www.autabuy.com/Vehicles/Details.cfmVID
=397552&Year-2005&Make=Harley-Davidson&Model=SoftailCustomFXSTC
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (selling a 2005 Harley Softail Custom FXSTC);
ClassyBikes, http://www.classybike.com/68253 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010)
(marketing a 2005 custom-built Harley Softail).
60. Among the many films celebrating the culture that has grown up
around this practice is GREASE (Paramount Pictures 1978).
61. For a thorough description of the history and culture of lowriders (in-
cluding many pictures of the modified cars), see Absolute Astronomy, Lowrid-
ers, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Lowrider (last visited Apr. 11,
2010).
62. See id.
63. See id. (describing some lowriders as being altered with an emphasis
on their hydraulic suspensions so that they can "hop").
64. See id. (noting that lowriders remain popular among youths on the
West Coast). Many examples of lowriders for sale may be found at CarsOnline,
http://www.cars-on-line.com/lowrider.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
65. See, e.g., Build Your Own Custom Powermatic Table Saw, http://www
.woodworkingonline.com/2007/12/27/build-your-own-custom-powermatic-table
-saw/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Free Table Saw Extension Plans, http://
wayneofthewoods.com/table-saw-extension.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
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arm saws, 66 router tables,67 shaper tables,68 and drill-press
platforms.69 Two zones of especially intense user innovation in-
volve workbenches70 and router jigs. 71 To a woodworker, a "rou-
ter" means not an electronic device used to connect two or more
computers, but rather a high-speed motor that drives a wide
variety of bits designed to make grooves of different shapes in
wood. Routers work most effectively when paired with accesso-
ries, known as jigs, that guide the placement of the grooves.
Commercial versions of such jigs can be purchased, but most
woodworkers make their own. Jig patterns are exchanged and
evaluated on various websites, the most popular of which is
RouterForums. 72
Another zone where user innovation flourishes is medicine.
For example, Christian Luthje reports that more than one third
of a large sample of surgeons working in German university
clinics had developed or improved a piece of medical equip-
ment. The primary motivation of most of them was neither a
desire to enhance their reputations nor the prospect of addi-
tional income, but rather a felt "need for performing surgery
66. See, e.g., Multi-purpose Cutting Station with Miter Saw and Radial
Arm Saw, http://lumberjocks.com/projects/23050 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010)
(showing an example of a miter table that has been upgraded to function as an
all-purpose cutting station).
67. See, e.g., John English Pro's Column: Router Table Tips, http://www
.norwesttools.com.au/page/shopinfo-page/alinfopage-idle/64 (last visited Apr.
11, 2010).
68. See, e.g., Make a Good Router/Shaper Table for Use with a Moto Tool,
http://www.airfieldmodels.com/information-source/howtoarticlesformodel_
builders/tools/dremelrouter_shaper-tablev2/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2010).
69. See, e.g., How to Build a Custom Drill Press Table, http://www.annel
davis.comlbobandanne/drillpresstable.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
70. See, e.g., How to Build a Custom Workbench, http://www.ronhazelton
.com/archives/howto/WorkbenchConstruction.shtm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010)
(giving instructions on how to build a custom four-section workbench with one
surface dropped to accommodate a sliding compound miter saw).
71. Jim Richey, All About Router Jigs, http://www.finewoodworking.coml
Workshop/WorkshopAllAbout.aspx?id=23077 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
72. See Router Forums, http://www.routerforums.coml (last visited Apr.
11, 2010) (providing access to fora on a variety of router-related topics). Pat-
terns for router jigs may also be found at FineWoodWorking, http://www.fine
woodworking.com/WorkshoplWorkshopDirectory.aspx?dir-Router+Jigs (last vi-
sited Apr. 11, 2010); on YouTube, at Making a Box Joint Jig: Making Quarter
Inch Router Cuts, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-mlrYflt5oB8 (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010); and at Wood Routers: About Wood Router Jigs, http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v-6--3yVWScCQ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
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easier, faster, cheaper, more convenient[ly] and less inva-
sive[1y] for the patient."73
At the opposite end of the social-utility spectrum is "circuit
bending."74 Invented (or at least named) by Reed Ghazala in
the 1960s, circuit bending consists of deliberately short-
circuiting mass-produced electronic devices to produce unusual
sounds.75 The devices commonly used for this purpose include
children's keyboards, toy guitars, and synthesizers. The tech-
nique is one of trial and error: one removes the cover or rear
panel of the device and then, using a jumper wire, begins con-
necting terminals at random, listening to the sounds that are
produced. When an intriguing noise is generated, one replaces
the temporary circuit that produced it with a semi-permanent
connection plus a switch, enabling the sound to be reproduced
later. Instruments created in this fashion can then be used to
perform electronic music.7 6 Circuit benders participate in an-
nual festivals,77 produce podcasts, and exchange ideas on the
blog, GetLoFi.78 CDs and compilations of MP3 recordings of
"bent" music can now be obtained on the Internet.79
73. Christian Luthje, Customers as Co-Inventors: An Empirical Analysis
of the Antecedents of Customer-Driven Innovations in the Field of Medical
Equipment (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with author); see also Wim G.
Biemans, User and Third-Party Involvement in Developing Medical Equip-
ment Innovations, 11 TECHNOVATION 163, 179-80 (1991); Brian Shaw, The
Role of the Interaction Between the User and the Manufacturer in Medical
Equipment Innovation, 15 R&D MGMT. 283, 288 (1985).
74. I am grateful to Paul Ohm of the University of Colorado Law School
for alerting me to this phenomenon.
75. See REED GHAZALA, CIRCUIT-BENDING: BUILD YOUR OWN ALIEN IN-
STRUMENTS; FEEL THE GHOST IN THE MACHINE; CREATE THE SOUNDS OF
ANOTHER DIMENSION; THIS IS TOTALLY TWISTED!; How TO GET NEW NOISE
FROM OLD TOYS 4 (2005). The title and subtitles of Ghazala's book on the sub-
ject suggest much concerning both the technique of circuit bending and the
culture that surrounds it. Id.
76. The most accessible introduction to the nature and purposes of circuit
bending is The Circuit Bending Documentary, http://absurdity.biz/Circuit
Bending/Bent.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
77. See Bent 2010, http://www.bentfestival.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010)
(announcing the date and location of the 2010 Bent Festival to celebrate cir-
cuit bending, hardware hacking, and do-it-yourself electronics).
78. See Circuit Bending Synth DIY, http://www.getlofi.com/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010) (providing a forum to exchange ideas and learn about circuit
bending).
79. See, e.g., Noise and Toys Volume 1, http://www.wearerecords.com/
noistoys.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (offering samples from a compact disc
album of circuit bending music).
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This completes our tour of varieties of user innovation,
both with respect to cultural goods and with respect to equip-
ment. The examples could be multiplied, but these seem suffi-
cient to suggest the flavor and variety of these activities.
In the past decade, the popularity of user innovation of
these sorts has increased sharply. With respect to cultural
goods, the recent surge can be attributed in large part to tech-
nology. Audio and video recordings, photographs, games, and so
forth have been distributed increasingly widely in digital for-
mats. At the same time, software enabling those materials to
be modified and combined has become ever more widely availa-
ble. The result, not surprisingly, has been a rapid increase in
the frequency with which consumers have modified the digital
products they acquire.80
With respect to equipment, the role of technology in facili-
tating user innovation is less straightforward. In some set-
tings-such as circuit bending-technology has made more
widely available the tools, skills, and products that enable us-
ers to play. In other areas, the increasing availability and de-
creasing cost of sophisticated programs for computer-aided-
design programs are expanding sharply the set of consumers
who can engage in innovation.81 However, in other settings-
such as cars-the increasing complexity of the underlying
products has made tinkering harder, not easier.
In both contexts, however, technology has had one clear-cut
impact: it has radically increased the ability of innovating users
to communicate with each other-to exchange ideas concerning
techniques and products, and to form communities centered on
their shared interests.82 This has both made user innovation
more popular and raised its profile.
80. See YOcHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS, 1-34 (2006);
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 35, at 122-23; Edward Lee, Warming Up to
User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1500-01 (citing a study in
which nearly half of those surveyed said they had created digital content for
others to view online). Benkler convincingly argues that the surge in user
modifications of cultural products was not "determined" by the new technolo-
gies. BENKLER, supra, at 16-18. Rather, technological change created a new
set of "affordances" that made the modifications easier and more likely. See id.
at 18. In Part V.B. I will consider the forces or impulses in addition to technol-
ogy that may have contributed to the surge.
81. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 37, at 121-24 (noting that individual hob-
byists can design new products, such as music and art, at an advanced level).
82. See BENKLER, supra note 80, at 372-75.
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II. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
How much do these two sets of user innovation really have
in common? They share, of course, one crucial feature: they
both involve modifications of products that have been produced
and distributed in large quantities. 83 But if they differ on other
important fronts, it may not make sense to lump them together
for analytical or policymaking purposes.
One potential difference is that user innovation in the con-
text of cultural goods typically generates modified products
that are more easily replicated and redistributed than the mod-
ified products generated by user innovation in the context of
equipment. An unlimited number of perfect copies of a digital
mashup can easily be made and circulated on the Internet. It is
more costly to reproduce a tablesaw extension or set of wind-
surfer footstraps.
To some economists and intellectual-property scholars, this
contrast might suggest that modifications of cultural goods dif-
fer in a fundamental respect from modifications of equipment:
the former are "public goods," while the latter are not.8 4 In oth-
er words, the former share two related characteristics: they
may be used and enjoyed by unlimited numbers of persons
without being exhausted; and it is difficult to exclude the public
at large from access to them once they are made available to
anyone. The latter have neither of these features.
If this way of characterizing the difference between the two
sets of modified products were accurate, it would have crucial
implications for legal policy. But, on reflection, it proves to be
overstated. In both contexts, the products themselves are often
rivalrous. Each of the VHS tapes used to store and distribute
The Phantom Edit and the Clean Play movies could only be
used at one time by one household. The same is true of Gar-
83. Some of the products being modified, such as popular songs and auto-
mobiles, have been produced and distributed in truly enormous numbers. Oth-
ers, such as the greeting card upon which Jeff Koons's String of Puppies was
based, see supra note 15, or technical ice axes, see supra note 40, are sold in
smaller markets. But all have been produced in quantities sufficiently large to
render irrelevant the policy issues implicated by alterations of unique or rare
works. Cf. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A (2006)
(limiting coverage of the statute to works of art produced in 200 or fewer cop-
ies).
84. For the theory of "public goods" on which this argument is based, see,
for example, JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 932-33
(Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909) (1848); J.G. Head, Public Goods and Public
Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197, 198-206 (1962).
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nett's Stones painting, each of the limited set of Obama Hope
posters, and so forth. The nonrivalrous dimension of each of
these things is not the object itself, but rather the innovation
the object embodies, the creative contribution that makes it
both different from the original product and desirable. The
same is true of modified equipment. It may be costly to repro-
duce footstraps, but the underlying idea-the discovery that, by
attaching footstraps to a windsurfer one could jump waves
without falling-is just as much a public good as the creative
contribution that lies behind The Grey Album. These observa-
tions do not make the difference between the two sets of activi-
ties disappear. The fact remains that most modifications of the
cultural products are more easily copied and shared than most
modifications of equipment. But it is a difference of degree, not
kind. At least for now, it should not prevent us from treating
them as members of the same family.
Another potential distinction between the two groups is
that they advance different ends. As their labels suggest, cul-
tural products entertain or enlighten us, while equipment is
"functional" in the colloquial sense. But again, the difference
proves to be, at most, a matter of degree. Many of the modifica-
tions of equipment involve entertainment just as much as mod-
ifications of cultural goods. Why does one trick out a Harley, al-
ter a car to make it capable of dancing, or create a rodeo kayak?
Not to get from point A to point B more efficiently. Rather, the
goal, as is true of many modifications of cultural goods, is to
play. A related point: a secondary (and occasionally primary)
objective of many of the modifications of equipment, like mod-
ifications of cultural goods, is aesthetic. Putting glitter on one's
basketball shoes does not enable one to jump higher. New de-
signs for flies are valued as much for their elegance and inge-
nuity as for their ability to attract fish. Again, these observa-
tions do not efface the distinction, but they make it less
categorical and fundamental.
Once these apparent differences are muted, the similarities
between the two sets of activities loom large. First and fore-
most, they both demand and express creativity. Second, large
numbers of persons engage in both of them. Third, often
(though not invariably) the participants in these activities or-
ganize themselves into communities. 86 Finally, the members of
85. For examples from the sphere of cultural goods, see LESSIG, supra
note 1, at 77-82, 200 (explaining how the creation of remixes, such as anime
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those communities typically share their innovations with one
another freely and without charge. Many of their innovations
are both valuable and, as we will see, could be protected under
intellectual-property law. So the innovators could charge for
access to them if they wished. But they rarely do.86
It is tempting to argue that yet another feature unites both
types of innovation: the people who engage in them typically
are amateurs. Or, to put the point slightly differently, both
types of activity are typically undertaken for "noncommercial,"
rather than "commercial," purposes. But that turns out to be
wrong. As the examples surveyed above make clear, many of
the modifiers are amateurs, but many are professionals. Jeff
Koons, Joy Garnett, Shepard Fairey, and the Clean Play edi-
tors-these are all surely professionals. The same is true of the
lobstermen, surgeons, and alpine guides who constantly tinker
with their tools. The professionals are somewhat more likely, as
one might expect, to charge for access to their innovations. But
most, remarkably, do not.
A subtler point: when one reads the biographies or autobi-
ographies of many of the participants in these activities, one's
confidence in the distinctions between amateur and profession-
al, and between noncommercial and commercial motives, is
shaken. Bradford Washburn, for example, began his extraordi-
nary mountaineering career climbing in New England with his
friends. He then spent some summers in Chamonix, hiring pro-
fessional guides to help him hone his skills and lead him up
harder routes. Gradually the guides came to treat him as an
equal, even though he was still paying them. Later he led a se-
ries of increasingly demanding expeditions in Alaska, funding
the ventures himself at first, then by selling the stories and
photographs that grew out of them. Still later, the National
Geographic Society financed some of his trips. Throughout this
process, he was constantly modifying his climbing and his pho-
tography equipment. And both the mountaineering and the
equipment modifications that accompanied it seem to have
been motivated primarily by a combination of curiosity and
music videos, educates users and generates a community with a shared inter-
est).
86. For more examples from the sphere of cultural goods, see BENKLER,
supra note 80, at 99-106; LESSIG, supra note 1, at 143-76. For substantiation




passion. 87 Was Washburn an amateur or a professional? Were
his motives noncommercial or commercial?
One might answer: he began as an amateur and gradually
became a professional. A similar trajectory might be traced in
the life stories (or aspirations) of many other user-innovators.
Examples would include: most of the people who now make
their livings creating "appropriation art"; the participants in
the Niketalk forums whose novel designs eventually earned
them jobs working for shoe companies;88 and Gay, who intro-
duced himself to the members of RouterForums as follows:
Hey everyone, I've been looking at the forum on and off for a while
now and finally decided to sign up. I'm into woodworking as a hobby
but hope to start making some money from it during the winters. My
main interest is making products from reclaimed, recycled or reused
materials. Here in Croatia it's hard enough to just to find some decent
router bits let alone any info on jigs or building your own router table,
so no doubt [I]'ll be asking lots of question[s] in the future.8 9
If this pattern were typical, it might suggest that, for ana-
lytical and policymaking purposes, we could differentiate ama-
teur and professional user innovations-and acknowledge that
some people make a transition over the course of their lives
from one sphere to another. 90 But that approach does not seem
terribly satisfactory. Some of the people with whom we are con-
cerned-like Graeme Obree, the pioneer Scottish bicycle racer
who made many breakthroughs in bicycle design 91-seem to
move during their careers back and forth across the profession-
alism boundary, and their orientations and motives at any one
point are hard to characterize. More importantly, this approach
would neglect the similarity between the outlooks, behavior,
and culture of the people who earn their livings modifying
things and those of the people who do it "for fun." The carpen-
ters employed by boatyards to modify customers' sailboats are
surely not identical to the people working nearby on their own
boats, but they share more than one might imagine. The same
can be said of artists who do graphic design for customers and
87. See DAVID ROBERTS, THE LAST OF His KIND: THE LIFE AND ADVEN-
TURES OF BRADFORD WASHBURN, AMERICA'S BOLDEST MOUNTAINEER 61-84
(2009).
88. See Fuller et al., supra note 44, at 64-68.
89. Posting of Gay to RouterForums, http://www.routerforums.com/
introductions/16944-hi-fromcroatia.html (Oct. 12, 2009, 02:53 EST).
90. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 254-59 (suggesting that we treat
amateur and professional remixes differently).
91. See THE FLYING SCOTSMAN (Doosra Production Limited 2006) (docu-
menting Obree's career and equipment innovations).
1434 [94:1417
USER INNOVATION
those who do it "for themselves." In short, at least for now, it
seems most sensible to avoid separating user-innovators into
professionals and amateurs.
III. PRODUCERS' RESPONSES
The reactions to these activities by the manufacturers and
distributors of the products being modified vary widely. At one
extreme are producers who enthusiastically embrace user inno-
vation. For example, many musicians are now making their re-
cordings available to the public under Creative CommonS92 li-
censes that permit users to prepare derivative works. 93 There
are several variations of this approach: users can be required to
allow others to modify their derivative works-or not; users can
be allowed to make and distribute their derivative works for
commercial purposes-or not.94 What they have in common is
express authorization of modifications. This posture is not li-
mited to little known musicians hoping to make names for
themselves; some high-profile groups, like Nine Inch Nails,
have taken the same position.95 Game manufacturers have long
adopted a similar posture, encouraging their customers to mod-
ify their products.96 Last but not least, Edward Lee has shown
that, recently, many representatives of the television and mo-
tion picture industries (including spokespersons for Viacom,
Warner Brothers, CBS, NBC Universal, MTV, and the MPAA)
have indicated that their companies or organizations now en-
dorse modifications and mashups of their creations, at least so
long as they are "noncommercial."97
92. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2010).
93. See, e.g., Thomas Goetz, Sample the Future, WIRED, Nov. 2004, http:/
www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/12.11/sample.html; Matt Haughey, Independent
Musicians, CREATIVE COMMONS, Oct. 1, 2005, http://creativecommons.org/
audio/musicians (describing how the folk-rock band The Walkingbirds planned
to use the Creative Commons licenses for their work).
94. See Creative Commons, License Your Work, http://creativecommons
.org/choose/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
95. See Nine Inch Nails, The Slip, http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (offer-
ing free downloads of the album The Slip under a Creative Commons license).
96. See J.D. LASIcA, DARKNET 250-51 (2005) (explaining the game indus-
try's reliance on modifications to games by users to help increase sales).
97. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1515-18 (citing comments from television
network executives who believe that condoning mashup videos encourages
consumers to be more interested in the original network shows); see also In-
terview with Michael Fricklas, General Counsel of Viacom, http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v-aaqAya-QqP8 (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (acknowledg-
ing that permitting mashup videos leads to heightened consumer participation
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Some equipment manufacturers also affirmatively embrace
user modifications of their products. Here's one:
The Portable Light Project is a non-profit research, design and en-
gineering initiative established by KVA MATx that creates new ways
to deliver de-centralized renewable power and light to the developing
world. Each Portable Light unit is a simple, versatile textile with flex-
ible photovoltaics and solid state lighting that can be adapted to local
cultures and customized by people using traditional weaving and sew-
ing technologies in an open source model. This creates the opportuni-
ty for greater levels of cultural acceptance and stewardship of this
technology, particularly for women who are often among the most
vulnerable in developing countries.98
Among the many adaptations that have been made in re-
liance on this invitation are vests into which the PLP photovol-
taic panels are sewn, which are then used by boda-boda 99 driv-
ers in Kenya to power portable lights and to charge their cell
phones. 100
One step removed from the endorsers are producers who,
when faced with unauthorized modifications of their products,
acquiesce. The owners of copyrights in sound recordings typi-
cally take no action when their works are "sampled" or mashed
up. In one well-publicized incident, Radiohead initially objected
to a remix of their album, In Rainbows, by Amplive but re-
treated when fans criticized their posture. 101
Most equipment manufacturers currently behave the same
way. They are plainly aware of at least some circumstances in
which users are modifying their products. They do not formally
endorse or authorize those activities, but they have not, as yet,
taken any action to stop them. For example, the management
of General Motors is surely aware of the ways in which its cars
are being modified to produce lowriders, but it has neither en-
couraged nor objected to the practice. Similarly, the manufac-
with original sources). For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, the
limitation of permission to "noncommercial" uses is problematic and will be
difficult to apply in practice.
98. About the Portable Light Project, http://portablelight.org/about (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
99. See Posting of Erik Hersman to AfriGadget, http://www.afrigadget
.com/2009/09/ (Sept. 5, 2009) (explaining that a boda-boda is a bicycle or mo-
torcycle taxi in East African countries).
100. See id. (describing how the PLP photovoltaic panels enable a boda-
boda driver to be contacted by customers throughout the work day).
101. See Lee, supra note 80, at 1503; Posting of Eliot Van Buskirk to Lis-
tening Post, http://www.wired.comllistening-post/2008/02/mp3s-amplives-r/
(Feb. 13, 2008, 07:47 EST) (announcing that Amplive and Radiohead reached
an agreement for Amplive to release the remixed album).
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turers of mountaineering equipment must be aware of the fre-
quency with which their products are customized by climbers.
But despite the risks of injury associated with some of those al-
terations, the manufacturers have not as yet sought to discou-
rage the practice.
The next position along the spectrum of responses is occu-
pied by producers who seek to block some, but not all, modifica-
tions of their products. A good example, within the field of cul-
tural goods, is J.K. Rowling. Reportedly, Rowling tolerates most
forms of fan fiction but aggressively pursues the writers of sto-
ries that include "pornographic or sexually explicit material
clearly not meant for kids."102 The Lego Group, a Danish com-
pany that produces (and holds the copyrights to) the famous
construction blocks, takes a similar stance. Most uses of its
products apparently do not trouble the company. But "a stop-
action film using Lego pieces and figures to depict a concert
performance of the song 'Tonight I'm Gonna Rock You Tonight,'
by Spinal Tap, the parody band featured in the 1984 mock doc-
umentary 'This is Spinal Tap"' went too far. 103 According to a
company spokesperson, the film "had some inappropriate lan-
guage, and the tone wasn't appropriate for our target audience
of kids 6 to 12."104 Accordingly, the company refused to author-
ize the distribution of the film on a DVD.105
Within the field of equipment manufacturers, the most no-
torious practitioner of this selective approach is Apple. When
Apple first introduced the iPhone, it did not permit users to de-
velop their own software applications that could run on the de-
vice.106 It later relented, but only partially. Currently, indepen-
dent developers of applications must submit their programs to
Apple for approval. Only if they receive Apple's imprimatur
may they be loaded on the phones. The primary criteria that
Apple applies when reviewing proposed applications are: (1) an
102. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Harry Potter and the Copyright Lawyer, WASH.
POST, June 18, 2003, at Al (quoting an attorney at Rowling's literary agency).
103. Andrew Adam Newman, Lego Rejects a Bit Part in a Spinal Tap DVD,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/business/1lego
.html?_r-2.
104. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. See id. To view the Lego Group video, see Lego Spinal Tap-Tonight
I'm Gonna Rock You Tonight, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-zTxzvsELd
DM&feature=playerembedded (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). I am grateful to
Judith Donath for the reference.
106. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND HOW
TO STOP IT 2 (2008).
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application may not touch or enhance the functionality of either
the phone itself or the iPod media player that the iPhone also
houses; (2) no processes may run in the background of the
iPhone operating system; and (3) no application may facilitate
copyright infringement.10 7 Thousands of proposed programs
have failed these tests-among them, Instinctiv Shuffle, dis-
cussed above, (which violates rule one); and third-party in-
stant-messaging and cut-and-paste systems (which violate rule
two).10S
A fourth response is to monetize the innovative impulses of
one's customers and users. This approach is becoming increa-
singly common among equipment manufacturers, who are be-
ing nudged in this direction by many scholars and commenta-
tors on marketing. It takes many forms. A straightforward
variant is simply to incorporate a user innovation into one's
commercial products without compensating the original inno-
vator. For example, when Mercury Marine learned that Steven
Lough (a repairman working for a boat dealership in Sarasota,
Florida), through "some trial and error [work] with his grandfa-
ther's metal lathe," developed a modified "upper seal assembly"
that reduced corrosion in Mercury's popular stern drives, Mer-
cury mimicked Lough's invention and included it in the next
generation of Mercury stern drives-and subsequently pre-
vailed in a patent infringement suit brought by Lough.109
Another variant of the monetization approach, already men-
tioned, is to sell customers "toolkits" that enable them more
easily to modify the products they purchase." 0 Yet another var-
iant is to create institutions that enable and encourage con-
sumers to participate in the processes of designing or testing
the manufacturers' products. Such institutions include manu-
facturer-sponsored "idea competitions,"11' the so-called collec-
107. See Posting of Matt Buchanan to Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/502
7790/why-we-still-need-the-iphone-app-black-market (July 23, 2008, 10:00
EST) (describing why many applications cannot be used on Apple products).
108. See id. (describing applications that do not meet Apple's criteria to be
used on Apple products).
109. See Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1115-16, 1122-23 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (concluding that Lough did not engage in experimental use and dec-
laring his patent invalid).
110. See Nikolaus Franke & Frank Piller, Value Creation by Toolkits for
User Innovation and Design: The Case of the Watch Market, 21 J. PROD. INNO-
VATION MGMT. 401, 412-13 (2004), for experiments that substantiate the con-
siderable financial benefit to the manufacturers of providing customers these
toolkits.
111. Piller and Walcher describe this technique as follows:
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tive customer commitment method, 112 and "collaborative cus-
tomer co-design" systems. 113 In all of these strategies, the man-
ufacturer in some way channels and then capitalizes on the in-
novative impulses of its customers, enabling it to make more
money.
Last but not least, many producers seek to prevent all un-
authorized modifications of their products. Some adopt this
stance to force modifiers to pay them license fees. For example,
the estate of Margaret Mitchell forbids the creation of unautho-
rized sequels to Gone With the Wind-but grants licenses to
Idea competitions build on the nature of competition as a means to
encourage users to participate at an open innovation process, to in-
spire their creativity, and to increase the quality of the submissions.
When the contest ends, submissions are evaluated by an expert panel.
Users whose submissions score highest receive an award from the
manufacturer, which is often granted in exchange for the right to ex-
ploit the solution in its domain.
Frank T. Piller & Dominik Walcher, Toolkits for Idea Competitions: A Novel
Method to Integrate Users in New Product Development, 36 R&D MGMT. 307,
307 (2006).
112. Ogawa and Piller describe the method as establishing an open line of
communication to customers to gain access to new products and designs. The
method permits companies to limit their financial risk in manufacturing a
product by initially gauging interest in a product via a small yet unidentified
market, and then stopping production if preorders do not meet expectations.
See Susumu Ogawa & Frank T. Piller, Reducing the Risks of New Product De-
velopment, 47 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 65, 66 (2006).
113. Frank Piller, Petra Schubert, Michael Koch, and Kathrin Moslein.
have described this approach as follows:
In this article we challenge the assumption that offering custo-
mized products requires an individual (one-to-one) relationship be-
tween the customer and the supplier. We argue that individuality
does not always mean one-to-one. On the contrary, collaboration
among customers in online communities (and not directly with the on-
line merchant) can help to overcome the mass confusion phenomenon
of customized products. We will introduce the concept of a collabora-
tive customer co-design environment which aims at reducing mass
confusion. In this context collaborative customer co-design refers to
the use of toolkits for customer co-design which are used interactively
between different actors. Using dedicated design toolkits, customers
can jointly work on a customized variant, either delivered to just one
member of the group or to all of them.
Frank Piller et al., Overcoming Mass Confusion: Collaborative Customer Co-
Design in Online Communities, 10 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 3, 4 (2005);
see also Christoph Berger et al., Co-Designing Modes of Cooperation at the
Customer Interface: Learning from Exploratory Research, 2 EUR. MGMT. REV.
70 (2005) (examining the benefits and challenges of collaboration between cus-
tomers, retailers and manufacturers); Per Kristensson et al., Harnessing the
Creative Potential Among Users, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT 4, 11-13




sequel writers who both pay sizeable license fees and abide by
restrictions on their plots (Scarlett may not die, no homosexual-
ity, etc.).114 Other producers seem uninterested in license fees;
they seek to prevent modifications altogether. For example,
some authors have announced blanket prohibitions on fan fic-
tion based upon their works. 15 And the owners of the copy-
rights in some sets of sound recordings-for example, EMI,
which owns the copyrights to the Beatles' works-seem bent
upon blocking mashups like The Grey Album, even if their
creators are willing to pay fees." 6
Many equipment manufacturers have adopted similar posi-
tions. Typically, their first line of defense is to adopt design fea-
tures that make it hard to disassemble or change their prod-
ucts. For example, Shimano, the leading manufacturer of high-
end bicycle components, deliberately constructs its parts in
ways that frustrate the efforts of purchasers to repair or change
them.117 Similarly, many manufacturers of consumer electronic
devices-such as TiVo and Apple-make it physically hard for
users to gain access to the "guts" of their systems. The second
line of defense is a threat to withdraw customer support: TiVo,
Apple, and like-minded equipment manufacturers typically
take the position that any effort to modify their products voids
their warranties.118 These two tactics work in tandem: it is
114. See Motoko Rich, Rhett, Scarlett, and Friends Prepare for Yet Another
Encore, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at E1.
115. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 350; Lee, supra note 80, at 1532-33
(noting that author Anne Rice has posted a message on her website expressly
prohibiting fan fiction based on her work). See generally Tushnet, supra note
24. For examples of cease-and-desist letters sent by authors within this group,
see Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/index.cgi
(hosting a database of cease-and-desist letters that fans have received from
copyright holders).
116. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 349-50; cf. Lee, supra note 80, at
1519-20 (noting that the music industry has had a "mixed response" to mash-
ups).
117. See Paul Rosen, Up the Vilorution: Appropriating the Bicycle and the
Politics of Technology, in APPROPRIATING TECHNOLOGY: VERNACULAR
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POWER 365, 373-75 (Ron Eglash et al. eds., 2004) (de-
scribing the history and business practices of Shimano).
118. The distributor of DVR Upgrade, a kit that increases the recording
capacity of a TiVo DVR, offers the following blunt statement of this stance:
Some people are using several of the items that we sell to upgrade
their TiVo. You must understand that this is dangerous. High voltag-
es are present inside your TiVo and you can be hurt if you open the
case. You must also understand that it WILL VOID YOUR TiVo
WARRANTY. Simply put, this means that it WILL VOID YOUR TiVo
WARRANTY if you open your TiVo. Like as in don't call or email me
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hard to modify these products; then, if you attempt to modify
them and something goes wrong, you have no recourse against
the manufacturer.
Jonathan Zittrain argues that the frequency of this last re-
sponse is increasing, at least with respect to devices that impli-
cate information technology.119 Ironically, the trend is being
driven at least in part by the demand of a subset of users for
secure, "glitch-free" equipment. Manufacturers are responding
by producing "locked-down," tamper-resistant devices. 120 If the
trend continues, the set of products susceptible to adaptation
will shrink.
In sum, a growing number of consumers are adapting
products, while a substantial and apparently growing number
of producers are trying to prevent or control that activity. In
the context of cultural goods, the conflict between these trends
has produced fierce litigation. To date, lawsuits have been
much less frequent with respect to equipment. That seems like-
ly to change soon.
IV. LAW
The legal system currently contains several rules that
might be invoked by either producers or user-innovators when
their interests conflict. We will begin by reviewing the various
doctrines that the producers do or might call upon. We will
then consider the doctrines within which the user-innovators
do or might take refuge.
First, all of the products that we have been calling cultural
goods-audio and video recordings, photographs, games, etc.-
fall within the coverage of copyright law. Until the late twen-
tieth century, the requirement that, to obtain copyright protec-
tion in the United States, one had to comply with various for-
malities (notice, registration, renewal, and so forth) had the
practical effect of confining copyright protection to a small sub-
set of cultural goods. However, those requirements have now
been eliminated. The result is that all cultural goods that
evince a bare minimum of creativity and that are fixed in any
or TiVo or Philips or Sony or anybody else if you damage something.
Don't even touch those Torx screws unless you fully understand this
and are prepared to toss it in the trash can if something goes wrong.
9th Tee Enterprises, TiVo Upgrades, http://9thtee.com/tivo-dt2.htm (2009).
119. See ZITrRAIN, supra note 106, at 101-03 (explaining the shift to "teth-




tangible medium of expression (snapshots, blog entries, finger
paintings, etc.) enjoy protection. 121 The holders of these copy-
rights have the exclusive rights to reproduce them, prepare de-
rivative works based upon them, distribute them, and publicly
perform or display them.122 As we have seen, most of the cul-
tural goods that users wish to modify are produced in large
quantities by companies. Almost invariably, those companies
have acquired the underlying copyrights-either through as-
signments or licenses from the original creators or by hiring
employees to create them.123 As a result, the companies are
well positioned, if they wish, to prohibit modifications of those
goods. If users defy those prohibitions, they may be forced to
pay the companies very substantial damages.124
The percentage of products that we have been calling
equipment that are subject to copyright law is much smaller:
only those that have aesthetic features that are either physical-
ly or conceptually separable from their utilitarian functions are
covered.125 However, many forms of equipment contain compo-
nents or features that are subject to patent protection. Unlike
copyright protection, patent protection does not arise automati-
cally upon fixation. Rather, the inventor must apply for a pa-
tent; persuade the Patent and Trademark Office that the in-
vention is novel, non-obvious, and useful; provide extensive
information concerning how to "practice" the invention, and pay
some significant fees.126 These hurdles discourage many inven-
tors. However, a large percentage of the products that users
wish to modify are manufactured and distributed by companies
that have been willing to assume these burdens. Typically,
their primary purpose in obtaining patent protection has been
to strengthen their positions with respect to their competitors,
not their customers. But the companies' right to prevent others
from "making" the products (or the patented components of
those products) may also be asserted against users who either
121. See Christopher Sprigman, Reforrn(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 485, 487-88 (2004).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
123. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 38-81.
124. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
125. See, e.g., Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913,
932 (7th Cir. 2004).
126. See generally U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patents Process,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (de-
scribing the steps required to obtain a patent).
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reconstruct them in the course of modifying them or make addi-
tional modified versions to share with their friends. 127
The producers of both cultural goods and equipment can
also sometimes invoke trademark law to discourage or penalize
unauthorized modifications. Specifically, if a modifier sells the
altered product, and the producer can show that the modifier's
behavior is likely to cause a significant group of consumers to
believe either that the altered version was produced by the
original manufacturer or that the manufacturer sponsored the
modification, the modifier will be subject to liability under the
Lanham Act. 128 It is also possible that the modifier could be
held liable for "dilution" under the Lanham Act or under paral-
lel state statutes if his or her conduct had the effect of "tarnish-
ing" the reputation of the trademark under which the manufac-
turer is distributing the original product.129
Last but not least, a user who surmounts a technological
barrier that a manufacturer has erected to discourage modifica-
tions of its products may be subject to serious criminal sanc-
tions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.130 Specifical-
ly, if a manufacturer has included in the product a
"technological measure that effectively controls access" to a co-
pyrighted work, 131 and the user, in order to modify the product,
"circumvents" that system-in other words, "avoid[s], by-
pass[es], remove[s], deactivate[s], or impair[s]" it132-- then the
user may have to pay a sizeable fine or go to jail.133 Because
"copyrighted works" include computer programs, and because
even modest technological fences are considered "effective,"1 3 4 a
large group of user-innovators risk liability under this provi-
sion.
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
129. See id. § 1125(c). To my knowledge, no published judicial opinion has
relied on this theory, but the current (generous) version of this section is rela-
tively new; we do not yet know how broadly it will be applied.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
131. See id. § 1201(a)(1).
132. See id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
133. See id. § 1204(a). For a recent application of these provisions, see Da-
vidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640 (8th Cir. 2005).
134. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,
318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that Content Scramble System, an encryption
system used to prevent copying of DVDs, "effectively controls access" to copy-




In short, the manufacturers and distributors of products
modified without their consent have many legal weapons they
can use to pursue the modifiers. But the modifiers are not de-
fenseless. Each of the doctrines summarized above is subject to
important limitations and exceptions.
The principal limitation to the copyright entitlements that
the producers could assert is the fair use doctrine. In brief, that
doctrine instructs courts to excuse putatively infringing beha-
vior if, after considering a list of factors-the "purpose and cha-
racter" of the behavior, the "nature" of the copyrighted work at
issue, the amount of copyrighted material the defendant took,
and the impact of the behavior, if it became widespread, on the
"potential market" for the copyrighted work-that behavior
seems, on balance, fair. 135 When sued, modifiers of copyrighted
works have frequently sought solace in the fair use doctrine-
sometimes successfully, sometimes not.136
Modifiers of patented products can use a different shield.
Whereas alterations of patented products sufficiently extensive
to constitute "reconstruction" of the products at issue are
deemed to violate the patentees' rights, alterations modest
enough to be considered "repairs" are permissible. 37 Not sur-
prisingly, user-innovators have tried to fit their behavior into
the latter category. In recent years, they have been successful
more often than not, but sometimes they fail. 138
The defenses available to modifiers accused of Lanham Act
violations are latent in the doctrine of "consumer confusion" it-
self. Courts, when asked to determine whether a defendant's
behavior will give rise to confusion concerning either "source"
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
136. For a discussion of some recent examples, notably Bill Graham Arch-
ives v. Dorling-Kindersley Ltd. and Blanch v. Koons, see Jeannine M. Mar-
ques, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham and Blanch v. Koons, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331, 334--47 (2007).
137. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S.
336, 346 (1961) (distinguishing permissible repairs from impermissible recon-
struction).
138. For a review of the relevant case law, see DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM
ON PATENTS § 16.03[3] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2004). In the past, patentees
have rarely pursued the modifiers themselves; rather, they have brought con-
tributory-infringement suits against the companies that produced and sold the
components that the modifiers employed to refurbish or alter their products.
See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 662 (1944). But as
the visibility and scale of user modifications grows, this may change.
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or "sponsorship," look to a laundry list of factors. 139 In some
cases, some of those factors point in the modifiers' direction.140
The text of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides
few footholds that can be employed by user-innovators who
seek to avoid liability for circumventing technological shields.
But the federal courts, loath to apply the statute as broadly as
its drafters seem to have intended, have adopted some addi-
tional requirements that the government must establish to se-
cure a conviction under the statute-which might benefit some
modifiers. 141
Finally, all of the doctrines that producers can invoke in
their efforts to suppress unauthorized modifications are limited
by one overarching legal norm: the protection secured by the
First Amendment for freedom of expression. Generally speak-
ing, courts are reluctant to rule that application of a federal
statute in a particular case will violate the federal Constitu-
tion. But they have been willing to do so increasingly often in
order to shield from liability expressive forms of user modifica-
tions. 142 And even when they do not expressly ground their rul-
ings in the First Amendment, courts will sometimes adopt ge-
139. The set of factors varies slightly by circuit. For comparisons of the
tests and empirical studies of their applications, see Barton Beebe, An Empiri-
cal Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 95 CAL. L. REV.
1581 (2006); Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revi-
siting of Barton Beebe's Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Se-
ries, Paper No. 09-32, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424142.
140. For cases that seek to provide guidance concerning when confusion of
this sort will or will not arise, see, for example, Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1947); Nitro Leisure Prods. v. Acushnet Co.,
341 F.3d 1356, 1359-65 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Karl Storz Endoscopy Am., Inc. v.
Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 853-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Davidoff & Cie,
S.A. v. PLD Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2001).
141. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng. & Consulting, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that, to establish a violation of
the DMCA, it must be shown that the technological protection measure being
circumvented bears some "reasonable relationship to the protections that the
Copyright Act otherwise affords" (quoting Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc. 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004))); cf. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the DMCA does not apply where the circumvented technological protec-
tion measure does not prevent reading or copying the computer program at
issue).
142. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186
(9th Cir. 2001); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165, 1166
(11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811
F.2d 26, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1987).
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nerous versions of statutory defenses to ensure that opportuni-
ties for expressive freedom are preserved.143
V. POLICIES
How should the doctrines reviewed in the preceding Part
be construed or reformed? Should the rights of producers be ex-
panded, constricted, or preserved? Little guidance in answering
those questions can be gleaned from the pertinent statutory or
constitutional provisions. We must look, instead, to the policies
implicated by the various forms of user innovations at stake. A
sizeable body of literature examines those policies in the con-
text of modifications of cultural goods. This Part summarizes
and assesses the arguments that have been made on behalf of
the producers and on behalf of the user-innovators-and then
considers the extent to which each of those arguments has sa-
lience in the context of modifications of equipment.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR PRODUCERS
Three arguments are commonly made in favor of granting
the producers of cultural goods and equipment broad authority
to control or prohibit modifications of their products. Each con-
stitutes a reasonably straightforward application of one of the
three major theoretical traditions concerned with the justifica-
tion and scope of intellectual-property rights.
The first of the three is utilitarian in character. For the
reasons already mentioned, the innovations that underlie most
cultural goods are public goods. In other words, they can be en-
joyed by unlimited numbers of people without being used up,
and once they have been made available to one person, it is dif-
ficult to prevent others from gaining access to them for free. 144
Those circumstances make it difficult for the creators of such
goods to recoup the costs of creation. Aware of that difficulty,
many potential creators will seek other jobs-which, in turn,
will deprive the public at large of the benefits of their potential
creations. To avoid this outcome, the government must some-
how ensure that creators are adequately compensated. It might
do so in several different ways, but the technique that govern-
143. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the song Barbie Girl did not infringe Mattel's trademark of
the Barbie doll).
144. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 199-200. The most notorious recent illu-
stration of these characteristics is the promiscuous sharing of sound record-
ings through peer-to-peer networks. See id. at 110-12.
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ments have employed most often in the past few centuries has
been to grant the creators rights to suppress competition in the
production and distribution of embodiments of their innova-
tions. 145 Initially, those rights did not include a right to prevent
the making of derivative works, but lawmakers gradually came
to believe that talented people would not have optimal incen-
tives to put their talents to work unless they could control, not
just the distribution of verbatim copies of their creations, but
also translations, abridgements, and adaptations thereof. In
other words, the social benefits (resulting from increased inno-
vation at the primary level) generated by enlarging creators'
rights along these dimensions were thought to exceed the social
costs (including diminution of creativity at the secondary level)
of those adjustments.
Assuming, for the moment, that this argument rests upon
a coherent account of the potential impact of monetary incen-
tives on creativity, 146 there is no doubt that its strength varies
radically by context. In some settings, nonmonetary incentives
seem more than sufficient to support optimal (or excessive) le-
vels of creativity.147 Snapshots and academic scholarship come
to mind. In other settings, the creators of literary and artistic
works are able to earn monetary rewards more than sufficient
to cover the costs of creation without relying on intellectual-
property protection at all. The classic example is trade books. 148
In still other settings, intellectual-property protection of some
sort seems necessary (at least if no other alternative mechan-
ism for compensating creators is available), but a simple prohi-
bition on the unlicensed making and distribution of verbatim
copies would suffice; creators do not need the additional reve-
nue that they could reap by licensing modifications of their
works. Arguably, an intuition that this is true of computer
software helps explain the stringent requirements that the
courts have imposed on plaintiffs who assert that defendants'
145. See id. at 200-01.
146. But see Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1192-98 (2007) (pointing out that the argument radi-
cally oversimplifies both the nature of creativity and the potential impact of
law upon it).
147. For an intriguing examination of contexts in which nonmonetary mo-
tivations seem sufficient, see Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use
and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 522-36 (2009).
148. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copy-




programs, though not identical, are excessively similar in
"structure, sequence, and organization."149 Finally, there may
be circumstances in which a generously construed exclusive
right to prepare derivative works is both necessary and suffi-
cient to create an optimal system of incentives. Stewart Sterk
argues that such circumstances are rare, but offers one context
that might fit the bill: "[W]hen the original work is an extraor-
dinarily high-budget movie with the potential for sales of toys,
t-shirts, and the like."'50 Derek Bambauer is similarly skeptical
of this argument in general, but presents evidence concerning
the economics of the comic-book business that suggests that it
may also qualify.151
Where along this spectrum do the types of cultural goods
that are employed in the various forms of user innovation con-
sidered in this Article fall? The short answer is that, while we
can speculate, we don't know. For example, it seems unlikely
that the incentives of motion-picture studios to produce com-
mercial films would be diminished significantly if the courts ex-
cused the creation of parody trailers-or even the production
and distribution of editions purged of nudity and violence. But
in truth, we don't have the data necessary to make such judg-
ments with confidence.
Recently, copyright owners in some fields-the music in-
dustry and journalism are the principal examples-have begun
making an additional argument that further complicates the
task of determining the optimal set of copyright entitlements.
Our core businesses are dying, they contend. If we are to avoid
extinction, we must find new sources of revenue. One such
source is licensing income from people who wish to mashup our
products. You tell us that user innovation is rapidly becoming
more popular? That's all the more reason to defend our rights
to charge the people involved. If you don't, the innovators may
soon find that they have nothing to mashup. Opinions concern-
ing the plausibility of this claim vary widely,152 but they are on-
149. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 706
(2d Cir. 1992).
150. Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1197, 1216 (1996).
151. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 381-82 (noting that Marvel Comics
generates the majority of its revenue from derivate works).
152. Compare ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: How TODAY'S
INTERNET Is KILLING OUR CULTURE 199 (2007) (advocating increased copy-
right infringement suits by media companies in order to reverse "the cut-and-
paste culture of the Web"), and Posting of Rob Merges to The University of
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ly opinions. Until we get better data, the best we can do is
count this argument as a colorable but not overwhelming ar-
gument in favor of the producers.
Economists have developed some variations on this primar-
ily utilitarian argument that seem to offer clearer justifications
for allowing creators to control modifications of their works. For
example, it has been observed that giving a creator the exclu-
sive right to prepare derivative works (a right distinct from her
right to make identical or substantially similar copies of her
creation) enhances her ability to engage in price discrimina-
tion-a practice that, by both increasing the creator's revenues
and reducing the numbers of persons priced out of the market
for the creation, may enhance social welfare. 153 It has also been
argued that permitting a creator to control modifications re-
duces transaction costs by centralizing (in her hands) the right
to grant licenses to make uses of the chains of derivatives that
fan out from the original. 154
Again, however, these arguments turn out to vary radically
by context. Both theoretical work and empirical studies show
that price discrimination (and thus the legal rules that enable
it) are socially beneficial in some settings but not in others. 155
Similarly, a failure to prohibit unauthorized modifications of
some cultural goods might indeed raise transaction costs. (Sup-
pose that you wanted to broadcast one of the expurgated Clean
Play movies; from whom must you obtain permission?) But as
Sterk has observed, in other settings the most effective way to
reduce transaction costs would likely be simply to eliminate al-
Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/
2009/03/ip-social-and-cultural-theory.html (Mar. 9, 2009, 17:02 CST) (arguing
that a culture that emphasizes participation "may significantly worsen" the
environment for creative and original works), with Posting of Madhavi Sunder
to The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw
.typepad.com/faculty/2009/03/ip-social-and-cultural-theory-madhavi-sunder.htm
(Mar. 10, 2009, 17:14 CST) (arguing that "democratic participation" enhances
the value of culture).
153. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 39 (2003); Michael J. Meurer,
Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 98-99
(2001).
154. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 153, at 110-11; Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV.
483, 512-13 (1996).
155. See Bambauer, supra note 3, at 364-69; William W. Fisher III, When




together the prohibition on the preparation of derivative
works.15 6
The second of the three arguments commonly advanced on
behalf of producers leads to a similarly uncertain and unstable
conclusion. It looks for guidance, not to considerations of social
utility, but to rights. The creators have worked extraordinarily
hard to provide us the cultural goods that we so value. In some
instances (e.g., commercial films), generating the products re-
quired enormous effort, time, and money. In other instances
(e.g., photographs), the products were generated with little ef-
fort, but considerable labor and resources were invested by the
creators in acquiring the skills and equipment necessary to
produce them. It is only fair to compensate the creators when
one uses their products. As John Tehranian puts the point, "de-
rivative rights are entirely consistent with a natural-law vision
of copyright, which maintains that an author should have ex-
clusive control over any works derived from their intellectual
creations."15 7 To shore up this argument, the creators and their
advocates point to various bodies of scholarship: the writings of
John Locke and the tradition in political theory based upon it,
social psychologists' writings on "equity theory," and so forth. 158
But the heart of this argument is intuitive: it is immoral to
make use of intellectual and artistic creations without paying
the creators.
To many, perhaps most, people, this argument has consi-
derable force when applied to unauthorized reproductions of
creative works. But whether it extends beyond the making of
verbatim copies to the preparation of derivative works is far
less clear. Is it immoral to make a mashup of The White Al-
bum? Robert Nozick's famous rhetorical question-"If I own a
can of tomato juice and spill it into the sea . .. do I thereby
come to own the sea . . . ?"159-suggests that, at some point, the
portion of the derivative work that is fairly attributable to the
original work becomes too small to support the assertion of
156. See Sterk, supra note 150, at 1217; see also Bambauer, supra note 3,
at 359-61; Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 1213, 1246 (1997).
157. John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copy-
right, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 490-91 (2005); see also Sterk, supra note 150,
at 1227-30.
158. See William W. Fisher III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITIcAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169-73 (Ste-
phen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
159. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 175 (1974).
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immorality. But when that line is crossed is extremely difficult
to say.
The third argument commonly made on behalf of producers
is rooted in the "personality" or "personhood" theory of property
in general and intellectual property in particular. The central
proposition of that theory is that the creators of intellectual
products define themselves in or through their creations.
Works of art, in particular, constitute manifestations or exten-
sions of the personalities of the artists. The law, it is said,
should recognize and protect those connections by giving crea-
tors the power to prevent the destruction or mutilation of their
creations even after they have been given away or sold. 160 In
Europe, this attitude finds expression in an extensive and en-
thusiastically enforced system of moral rights.161 In the United
States and other common-law countries, the more narrowly cir-
cumscribed Visual Artists Rights Act 62 and a patchwork of
state art-preservation statutes reflect weaker (but growing)
commitment to the underlying theory. 163
The force of this third argument in the settings with which
we are concerned is reduced by the fact that all of the products
being modified have been manufactured and distributed in
large quantities. Many people, even in the United Sates, are
outraged when a unique sculpture is destroyed or defaced. The
outrage is nowhere near as strong when one of a million VHS
tapes containing a motion picture is cut and spliced to produce
an expurgated version of the film. To be sure, we may feel that
the director of the film still has a complaint: the altered version
is untrue to his artistic vision. But that is a different, and less
compelling, objection than the plea that can be made by or on
behalf of the sculptor. Moreover, as Lawrence Lessig points out,
it could be at least partially neutralized, ironically, by a legal
rule permitting the editing of the film. 16 4 So long as unautho-
rized modifications of cultural goods are (or are widely thought
to be) unlawful, members of the public seeing such a modifica-
160. See Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The Conceptual Transformation of Moral
Rights, 55 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 67, 67-68 (2007); see also Seanna Valentine
Shiffrin, Intellectual Property Theory, in 2 A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 653, 654-63 (Goodin, Pettit & Podge eds., 2007).
161. See id.
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
163. Cf. Rigamonti, supra note 160 (offering a more complex history of the
relationship between personality theory and the spread of moral rights).
164. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 257 ("If the owner can't control the use,
then the misuse is not the owner's responsibility.").
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tion are likely to assume that the original creator either made
or permitted the change. If the altered version does indeed dis-
tort the creator's vision, the creator will be hurt. By contrast, if
modifications are (and are known to be) lawful and if modified
versions are clearly marked as such, the creator's pain would
surely diminish. Not dispelled entirely, perhaps-seeing one's
work "bastardized" may still sting; but the hurt will be at least
less severe.
In combination, these three arguments are probably suffi-
cient to create a prima facie case for the recognition of a right
on the part of the creators of cultural goods to control modifica-
tions thereof. In other words, if no comparable or more power-
ful counterarguments could be made on behalf of the modifiers,
the law should probably favor the original creators. Before ask-
ing what those counterarguments might be, we need to deter-
mine the strength of each of these arguments in the related
context of modifications of equipment.
The first of the three arguments-that the ability to control
modifications is necessary to sustain socially optimal levels of
creativity-seems, on balance, weaker in the context of equip-
ment. Empirical studies suggest that, except in the pharma-
ceutical and biotechnology industries, patent rights play at
most a modest role in creating incentives for innovation.165 If
the ability to prevent competitors from mimicking their tech-
nologies is not central to managers' decisions concerning when
and whether to engage in research and development, it seems
unlikely that those decisions would be affected significantly by
whether the managers had the right to prevent or license mod-
ifications. Even if the right to control modifications did stimu-
165. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14 (2008)
(finding that patents play a 'limited and highly contingent" role in promoting
innovation); Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secre-
cy for Appropriation, 30 RES. POL'Y 611, 621-23 (2001) (finding that research
and development firms value secrecy over patents); Wesley M. Cohen et al.,
R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the Unit-
ed States, 31 RES. POL'Y 1349, 1364 (2002) ("[P]atents are reported to be the
least effective among the major appropriability mechanism in the preponder-
ance of US industries . . . ."); G. Dosi et al., How Much Should Society Fuel the
Greed of Innovators? On the Relations Between Appropriability, Opportunities
and Rates of Innovation, 35 RES. POL'Y 1110, 1118-19 (2006) (concluding that
adjusting the level of patent protection would have little impact on creative
innovation); Henrik Sattler, Appropriability of Product Innovations: An Em-
pirical Analysis for Germany, 26 INT'L J. TECH. MGMT. 502, 514-15 (2003)




late additional research by producers, it is far from clear that
such research any longer materially advances social welfare.
The reason, as Carliss Baldwin and Eric von Hippel argue, is
that the pace of user innovation may now be so great that re-
search and development by producers is now largely super-
fluous.1 66
However, as was true in the context of cultural goods, the
salience of these considerations surely vary by context. In some
industries, the ability to control the markets for adaptation and
accessories are more valuable than others. For example, the
management of Apple seems to think that the ability to control
the distribution of applications for the iPhone is critical to the
success of the product. The primary reason is not that Apple
stands to earn a great deal of money from the developers or us-
ers of applications (although the fact that Apple currently
keeps thirty percent of the revenue generated by sales of au-
thorized applications167 suggests that this factor is not trivial).
The primary reason, rather, seems to be that Apple believes
that its reputation for bug-free, reliable, fully interoperable
hardware and software would be endangered by the promis-
cuous circulation and use of unscreened applications.168 In the
view of at least some observers, Apple is correct-and indeed,
shrewd management of applications may be critical to commer-
cial success in the PDA market. 169 Against this backdrop, it is
plausible that depriving manufacturers of the ability to control
applications would indeed adversely affect levels of innovation
166. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift:
From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation 23-24
(MIT Sloan Sch., Working Paper No. 4764 -09, 2009), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1502864.
167. See John Markoff & Laura M. Holson, Apple's Latest Opens a Develop-
er's Playground, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at C8; David B. Yoffie & Michael
Slind, Apple Inc., 2008, at 14 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Case Study 9-708-480, 2008).
168. See Robert Mullins, Unauthorized iPhone Apps Market Flourishes, PC
WORLD, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.pcworld.com/article/137766/unauthorized
iphone -apps_marketflourishes.html.
[Developers] understand why Apple is being protective of its platform.
If someone installs an unauthorized application and it breaks some
other part of the iPhone, a customer will blame Apple, not the devel-
oper. If an iPhone software upgrade somehow disables an unautho-
rized app, Apple can't have to worry about apps it doesn't support in
the first place.
Not all observers are persuaded. Jonathan Zittrain, for example, argues that
Apple is motivated at least in part by the simple desire to maintain the high
profit margins associated with its dominance of the multifunction PDA-cell
phone market.
169. See Markoff & Holson, supra note 167, at C8.
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in PDAs. In other industries (cars, boats, and fishing equip-
ment come to mind) the ability to control modifications seems
far less critical. Similarly, while in some industries (kitesurfing
and rodeo kayaking come to mind) the intensity of user innova-
tion may well be so great that, as Baldwin and von Hippel ar-
gue, society gains little or nothing by offering financial carrots
to manufacturers. 170 In other industries (automobiles for exam-
ple), this speculation seems implausible.
The second of the three arguments-that it is immoral to
appropriate, without compensation, some of the value of the la-
bor invested by the original producer-seems, if anything,
slightly stronger as applied to modifications of equipment than
as applied to modifications of cultural goods, for the simple rea-
son that, on average, it probably requires more time and money
to generate equipment of the types that users like to tweak
than it does to generate most cultural goods. Once again, how-
ever, within each category there are wide variations. High-
quality sound recordings and photographs are increasingly
cheap to produce, 171 but movies and multiuser online games are
still very expensive. Cars, boats, and power tools are expensive,
but bicycles, phones, and keyboards are relatively cheap. With
respect to cultural goods, popular receptivity for the moral ar-
gument seems to vary directly with cost.172 The MPAA-
sponsored previews that plead with the audience to respect the
legitimate interests of the key grips at least does not provoke
catcalls, while a similar pitch with respect to sound recordings
surely would. Much the same is likely true with respect to
types of equipment.
Finally, the argument grounded in personality theory
seems distinctly weaker as applied to equipment. The notion
that mashing up a song threatens the personhood of the com-
poser or performer is at least colorable. A claim that customiz-
ing a boat poses a comparable threat to the personhood of the
naval architect or the builder is not.
Where does this leave us? Again, the three arguments, in
combination, seem sufficient to create a prima facie case for re-
stricting modifications of equipment. But that case seems less
170. See Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 166, at 26-27.
171. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 30.
172. The attitudes that likely underlie this reaction are explored in J. Sta-
cy Adams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 422, 424 (1963) ("When the normative expectations of the person
making social comparisons are violated ... feelings of inequity result.").
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strong, all things considered, than the comparable case in the
context of cultural goods.
B. ARGUMENTS FOR USERS
Even in circumstances in which one or more of the argu-
ments reviewed in the preceding section have bite, it may make
sense nevertheless to permit the interests of users to modify
works without restriction to trump the interests of the produc-
ers to prevent or control the conduct of the users. Three reasons
for doing so have been advanced in the context of modifications
of cultural goods.
1. Efficiency
An important group of scholars contends that producers
should be compelled to give way when (and only when) the so-
cial costs of permitting them to exercise their rights-in partic-
ular, their exclusive right to prepare derivative works-would
exceed the benefits thereof.173 This is most likely to occur
"when the costs of transacting with the copyright owner over
permission to use the copyrighted work would exceed the bene-
fits of transacting."17 4 One such context is parody. Parodies,
economists generally recognize, are socially valuable. They en-
tertain people, and they sometimes provide consumers useful
information concerning the demerits (or merits) of the works
being parodied. But if creators have the right to block parodies,
they will do so. Why? Partly for the obvious reason that crea-
tors, like most of us, do not like to be made fun of. Partly for the
less obvious reason that a parodist cannot charge consumers
enough to cover the full social benefits of the parody (for exam-
ple, the benefits reaped when the first set of consumers retell
the jokes)-and thus will not be able to offer the original crea-
tor a license fee high enough to offset the injury the creator an-
ticipates experiencing. Thus, even though the aggregate social
benefit of the parody exceeds the social cost, the transaction ne-
173. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600, 1657 (1982); William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use
and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1646
(2004). But cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A
Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034-35 (2002) (suggest-
ing that this is not the only circumstance in which the fair use doctrine should
apply).




cessary to permit the parody to be created and distributed will
not occur. To prevent such market failures, these scholars ar-
gue in favor of excusing as "fair uses" modifications of copy-
righted works that constitute genuine parodies. 75 Plainly,
adoption of this approach would have the effect of excusing an
important subset of the types of modifications of cultural goods
with which we are concerned-at least until alternative me-
chanisms for overcoming the transaction costs could be de-
vised.176
How much force does this argument have in the context of
equipment? At first glance, not much. None of the various ways
described in Part I by which users modify equipment consti-
tutes parody.177 But the general approach exemplified by the
economists' analysis of parody might have much more general
applicability to equipment than originally thought. An especial-
ly ambitious and insightful version of such an argument can be
found in the pioneering work of Eric von Hippel. He contends
that five circumstances, in combination, strongly suggest that
users should be permitted to modify the products they pur-
chase. First, users' needs are diverse; customization of consum-
er products is essential to satisfy those needs fully.178 Second,
many users are skillful customizers, and the increasing availa-
bility and decreasing cost of technologies that facilitate custom-
ization is leading to a rapid growth in their ranks.179 Third,
manufacturers are surprisingly bad customizers, in part be-
cause the information they need to ascertain and meet consum-
ers' diverse needs is "sticky."80 Consumers only develop that
information through experience and have difficulty recording it
and transmitting it to manufacturers.181 One manifestation of
175. See, e.g., id. at 71-73. For Posner, a genuine parody is one that "uses
the parodied work as a target rather than as a weapon" and does not "take so
large a fraction (somehow computed) of the copyrighted features of the original
work as to make the parody a substitute for that work." Id. at 71.
176. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557,
581-84 (1998).
177. One could imagine such things: a grotesque exaggeration of a feature
of a basketball shoe (thickness of the sole, size of the cushioning bladder)
meant to make the feature in question look silly; sewing multiple overlapping
pockets on a fly-fishing vest in order to mock the packrat tendencies of fly-
fishermen. But such examples are likely to be rare.
178. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 37, at 33-34.
179. See id. at 19-22.




manufacturers' clumsiness in this regard is the remarkably
high percentage of consumer products that fail commercially.182
Fourth, "agency costs" sharply limit the ability of consumers to
hire either manufacturers or third parties to do the customiza-
tion for them.183 Last, but not least, many users like to inno-
vate. The process, in other words, provides a substantial subset
of consumers important experiential benefits in addition to the
increased functionality of the customized products it gene-
rates. 8 4 In short, allowing users to innovate will make every-
one better off. Users' needs will be better addressed. Users will
have more fun. And manufacturers will make more money, be-
cause fewer products will fail and because users are willing to
pay more for products with which they are permitted and able
to tinker.
This is a powerful argument. Understood as an outline of a
business plan, it is compelling. Understood as a justification for
legal reform, however, it seems to be missing one key element:
a theory of market failure. It is hard to see why the welfare-
maximizing state of affairs would not emerge through volunta-
ry transactions between manufacturers and users. If von Hip-
pel is correct, manufacturers should permit their customers to
alter their products freely (and indeed, should provide them
toolkits to assist them in doing so) and then raise the prices
they charge for those products. As we have seen, many manu-
facturers are doing exactly that. But not all. Apparently, those
that have thus far eschewed von Hippel's approach have done
so, not because transaction costs prevent them from monetizing
consumers' desire for freedom to innovate, but because they be-
lieve that it will cost them more in some other way-for exam-
ple, through erosion of their reputations for interoperable, bug
free products.185 In the absence of a reason why the premium
that users would pay for the right to innovate does not capture
all of the social benefits of permitting them to do so, it is hard
to see why the law should be altered to force manufacturers to
do what they believe is not profit maximizing. Such a reason
may be forthcoming, but until then, this first argument for
trumping the manufacturers' right to prevent or control modifi-
cations seems vulnerable.
182. See id. at 107-08.
183. See id. at 6, 46.
184. See id. at 60.
185. See Jenna Wortham, Apple's Game Changer, Downloading Now, N.Y.




The second of the three approaches seeks to promote not
economic efficiency, but rather distributive justice, defined
broadly as the fair distribution of income, wealth, and power.
The starting point of the argument is the uncontroversial prop-
osition that, currently, income, wealth, and power are all highly
concentrated, both in the United States and in the world at
large. Some data: as of 2007, the top 10% of citizens earned
49.7% of total income in the United States.186 That percentage
is higher than the comparable percentage at any point during
the twentieth century-well above the rate of roughly 34% that
prevailed between World War II and 1980 and slightly higher
than the rate during the stock-market bubble of 1928.187 More-
over, as of 2007, the top 1% of Americans earned 24% of total
income-well above the rate of roughly 10% that prevailed be-
tween World War II and 1980 and just slightly lower than dur-
ing 1928, the previous high.188 Inequality of wealth is even
greater. As of 2000, the top 10% of American adults owned
roughly 70% of total household wealth (defined as "the value of
physical and financial assets less debts"). 189 When the frame of
reference is expanded to the world, the disproportion becomes
even more extreme. As of 2000, the richest 10% of adults owned
roughly 85% of global household wealth; the richest 1% owned
40%.190 No similarly concrete indicators of the concentration of
political power are available, but there is little doubt that the
same generalization holds: both in the United States and
worldwide, a small percentage of people enjoy disproportionate
influence over the rules, policies, and practices by which we are
governed. Nor is there much doubt that economic and political
power are correlated.191 Last but not least, in most modern so-
cieties, semiotic power-control over the fog of symbols in
186. EMMANUEL SAEZ, STRIKING IT RICHER: THE EVOLUTION OF TOP IN-
COMES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Aug. 5, 2009), http://elsa.berkeley.edul-saez/
saez-UStopincomes-2007.pdf.
187. See id. at 5 fig.I.
188. See id. at 6 fig.2.
189. Press Release, United Nations Univ.-World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Re-
search, Pioneering Study Shows Richest Two Percent Own Half World Wealth
(Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.wider.unu.edulevents/past-events/2006
-events/enGB/05-12-2006/.
190. Id.
191. See Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Ac-
cept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104-11 (2009) (discussing the relationship be-




which we move and with which we define ourselves-is also
highly concentrated. Most observers think that the degree of
concentration increased steadily during the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, as the density of the fog grew and as the
number of movie studios, television networks, record compa-
nies, advertising agencies, and political consultants with signif-
icant influence on it shrank. Optimistic commentators contend
that the Internet is facilitating a reversal of that trend, but
there is little doubt that the degree of concentration of semiotic
power remains high.192
The next step of the argument is the somewhat more con-
troversial proposition that this degree of concentration is exces-
sive, and that the law should be reformed so as to reduce the
levels of inequality in each of these dimensions. By how much?
On that question, philosophers and political theorists have ar-
gued for centuries. Among the major contending efforts to de-
fine the standard with respect to which the current situation
falls short are Ronald Dworkin's proposal of "equality of re-
sources,"193 John Rawls' "difference principle,"194 Derek Parfit's
"prioritarianism,"195 and Harry Frankfurt's "sufficientism." 196
But we need not plunge into this debate, because there is wide-
spread agreement that, when measured by any of these stan-
dards, the levels of concentration that currently prevail both in
the United States and the world are unjustifiably high.
The set of rules governing modifications of cultural goods is
one of the many doctrinal contexts in which scholars have
sought to identify reforms that would help alleviate that con-
centration. Three recommendations-all pointing toward
192. See, e.g., John Clarke, Pessimism Versus Populism: The Problematic
Politics of Popular Culture, in FOR FUN AND PROFIT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LEISURE INTO CONSUMPTION 28, 30-34 (Richard Butsch ed., 1990); Michael
Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 140 (1993).
193. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 186 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2:
Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 passim (1981).
194. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60-65, 298-303 (rev. ed.
1999); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42-50, 57-61
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
195. See Derek Parfit, Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas: Equali-
ty or Priority? (Nov. 21, 1991). This lecture has been reproduced in its entirety
in THE IDEAL OF EQUALITY 81, 101-16 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams
eds., 2000).




greater latitude for user innovation-emerge from their work.
First, Molly Van Howeling argues that the fair use doctrine
should be adjusted so as to increase its capacity to advance one
of its traditional functions-namely, reducing the costs borne
by "poorly financed creators" and the prices paid by "poor con-
sumers who benefit from the recasting of expensive works."197
Specifically, "[c]ourts could simply take ability to pay into ac-
count as part of the fair use calculus. Or, to use the language of
the statutory fair use provision, avoiding unaffordable license
fees could be considered a valid 'purpose' of unauthorized copy-
ing."198 Second, modifications of cultural goods that reflect or
enable attacks on concentrations of economic or political power
should be privileged. Some examples are obvious: parodies of
presidents or favorable depictions of stone-throwing demon-
strators. Others are less obvious and more interesting. For in-
stance, Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder have shown
that modifications of the relative importance of the characters
in Star Trek episodes frequently evince criticism of the subor-
dinate roles played by women and racial minorities in almost
all of those episodes.199 More broadly, the "[f]lattering self-
insertion" characteristic of much Mary Sue fiction "offers a par-
tial antidote to a media that neglects or marginalizes certain
groups."200 On that basis, they argue persuasively that the law
should afford greater latitude to works of this genre.201 The
third, most sweeping, and (as I among others have argued pre-
viously) most powerful of the recommendations is that all mod-
ifications of mass-produced cultural goods should be treated
more favorably because they both manifest and promote "semi-
otic democracy"-decentralization of the power of making cul-
tural meanings. 202 This is particularly true when the recordings
are not kept private, but are widely disseminated.
197. Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1543-45, 1568-69 (2005).
198. Id. at 1569.
199. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 28, at 602-09.
200. Id. at 609.
201. See id. at 602-09.
202. Among the many works that have explored this theme are BENKLER,
supra note 80, at ch. 8; FISHER, supra note 22, at ch. 1; JOHN FISKE, TELEVI-
SION CULTURE 236-39 (1987); NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX (2008);
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Oren
Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything
and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (2007); Chander &
Sunder, supra note 28; Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of
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Which, if any, of these recommendations has bite in the
context of modifications of equipment? The second and third
don't seem to have much salience. Few if any of the examples
we have seen of user innovation in the context of equipment
could fairly be described as political commentary. And increas-
ing opportunities for innovation in this domain would do little
to advance semiotic democracy, for the simple reason that nei-
ther the products being modified nor the modified versions are
often important vehicles of cultural meanings. To be sure, the
trademarks they bear and the advertisements by which they
are sold are crucial arenas for semiotic expression and contes-
tation. But the objects themselves-the fishing rods, surgical
equipment, boats, keyboards, and so forth-are not crucial
components of the fog. And it is the objects, not the trademarks
or ads, that the users are tweaking.
The first of the scholars' recommendations, however, may
be more relevant than first appears in the context of equip-
ment. Increasing opportunities for user modifications may help
the global poor. A suggestive example is provided by Ethan
Zuckerman. 203 He points out that many residents of the Con-
go-indeed, of rural areas throughout the developing world-
cook their food over charcoal fires. This is bad for them in many
ways:
Charcoal is an environmental nightmare. You get it by cutting down
living trees, digging pits and partially burning them. Then you take
the resulting coal and put it into sacks and sell it to women, who
bring it home to cook with. They often cook inside, creating fumes and
smoke that damages their children's health. Basically, the only good
thing you can say about charcoal is that it's cheap and people like to
use it. Except that it's not cheap anymore. As the authorities in the
[Congo] try to prevent destruction of gorilla habitat, they're protect-
Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEx. L. REV.
1853 (1991); Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215
(1996); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998); Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U.
L.R. 489 (2006); David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and
the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright
Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245
(2001); Madow, supra note 192, at 146; Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV.
257 (2006).





ing the forests from logging. This means lots less wood to turn into
charcoal, which means rising prices. 204
Zuckerman describes how a philanthropic organization
named Wildlife Direct, working closely with two German
equipment manufacturers, sought to remedy the problem. They
developed, produced, and distributed in the Congo elegant
stoves capable of burning plant oils, which could be obtained
easily and cheaply from palm nuts and other readily available
crops. 205 The well-intentioned project failed. What succeeded
(or rather, is in the process of succeeding) is "biomass charcoal,"
a technology developed by the Africans themselves that em-
ploys simple presses to squeeze plant waste into a form that
can be burned. 206 From this (and many other examples), Zuck-
erman distills some lessons that echo von Hippel's guidelines:
to effectively meet the needs of the global poor, a technological
innovation must be locally made, use local materials, be repair-
able locally, and conform to local culture. 207
The story of biomass charcoal does not implicate any of the
legal rules with which we are concerned. But lurking in Zuck-
erman's narrative is a general proposition that does merit our
attention: decentralized user innovation may be of special im-
portance to the poor, particularly in developing countries. If so,
we should be leery of erecting legal rules that would inadver-
tently impede such projects. Also lurking in the narrative, how-
ever, is a note of caution. The German plant-oil stoves may ac-
tually have been better for the Congolese than biomass
charcoal. The failure of the former and the success of the latter
may illustrate the general phenomenon of "local maxima":
modest improvements of existing technologies may prevent
adoption of more disruptive but, in the long run, superior new
technologies. 208 Thus we should not assume that Zuckerman's






208. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HRv. L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1996); Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the
Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52 n.176 (2009).
209. An example of a successful philanthropic effort that does not conform
(at least, does not conform fully) to Zuckerman's guidelines is the development
by a group of Danish and African engineers of a biogas stove and lamp that
can be used by poor African and Southeast Asian families to cook food and




The last of the arguments that can be made on behalf of
user-innovators has a different flavor. It begins by developing a
substantive vision of human flourishing and then asks what ad-
justments of legal doctrine would provide as many people as
possible access to a life consistent with that vision. Analyses of
this general sort are unusual in modern American legal scho-
larship, in part because they repudiate the principle central to
both the dominant form of economic analysis and to the domi-
nant form of contemporary liberalism: that the state ought to
remain neutral concerning alternative conceptions of the
good.210 But this argument has deep roots, both in philosophy
(for example, in the work of Aristotle, the Stoics, Marx, John
Stuart Mill, T.H. Green, and Michael Sandel) and in political
practice (for example, in the "republican" tradition of eigh-
teenth-century British and American politics; the Populist
movement of the late nineteenth century; and the New Left of
the 1960s and 1970s).211 Many years ago, I tried to distill from
these sources a conception of human flourishing that could be
used as the foundation for a critical analysis of copyright law.
The passage (abridged and stripped of footnotes) in which I de-
scribed that conception is set forth below.
The good life is a life of self-determination, commitment, moderate
risk, and meaningful work. The activities, bonds, and communities
through which a person defines himself are freely chosen; the person
is engaged in projects and relationships that carry with them a
chance of failure; work is important and, for the most part, creative.
Brief explications of the components of this conception and an expla-
nation why they do not conflict with one another follow.
(a) Work.-Marx's most durable insight is that productive activity
is "the life of the species"-that work is natural, not something to be
lamp.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (biogas lamp); Superfiex, http://www
.superflex.net/tools/supergas/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010) (biogas stove). The
Superflex project that developed and produces the stove and lamp more closely
resembles the failed German plant-oil initiative than the successful biomass
charcoal initiative. Id. I am grateful to Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder
for alerting me to the Superflex project-although I am not sure either of them
would interpret it as I do.
210. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 191-204 (1985) (de-
scribing liberalism as concerned with a view of equality that "supposes that
political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent of any particular
conception of the good life"); Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE 15-16 (2002) ("The hallmark of welfare economics is that
policies are assessed exclusively in terms of their effects on the well-being of
individuals.").
211. Cf. Fisher, supra note 158, at 172, 192-94.
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endured or escaped, and that the quality of a person's existence is
closely related to the quality of his work. What is good work? The ad-
jective that best captures Marx's answer is "meaningful." Meaningful
work requires skill and concentration, presents the laborer with chal-
lenges and problems he can overcome only through the exercise of in-
itiative and creativity, and is part of a larger project he considers so-
cially valuable and must take into account in making his
decisions....
(b) Risk and Vulnerability.-Excessive security makes for a flat
life. Excessive desire for security-for certainty that one's projects
will succeed, that one's relationships will not deteriorate, and that
one will not be hurt physically or emotionally-leads to unambitious
and unrewarding projects, shallow relationships, and dull play. The
good life is an intense life, and intensity depends in part on adventu-
rousness. To be vulnerable, to be not fully in control of one's life, is a
good thing, a condition to be sought, not shunned. To avoid friendship
and love, to eschew all attachment to possessions, to refuse to nourish
or gratify one's passions because all of those things expose one to the
risk of loss, to the vagaries of fortune, and to the wills of others, is to
be not fully human.
The notion that some degree of risk and vulnerability is desirable
coheres in two ways with the value of meaningful work. First, en-
gagement in meaningful work fosters confidence, innovativeness, and
sense of worth, which in turn support a willingness to take chances.
Second, the possibility that a project on which one is working will not
realize one's hopes helps prevent creative work from "degenerat[ing]
into narcissism or self-indulgence"; the worker's desire to succeed,
and knowledge that he may not, keeps his mind off "self-realization"
and increases the likelihood that he will attain it.
(c) Self-Determination.-To live well means, among other things,
to take responsibility for one's self. "One's dignity resides in being, to
some important degree, a person of one's own creating, making,
choosing, rather than being merely a creature or a socially manufac-
tured, conditioned, manipulated, thing: half animal and half mechan-
ical and therefore wholly socialized."
To emphasize self-determination is not to deny that our identities
are substantially socially determined-that both our initial senses of
self and our capacity to reflect upon the selves we wish to become de-
rive to a large extent from the communities in which we are reared,
and that those communities inevitably exert powerful influences over
our subsequent lives. But the person who depends too much for his
identity and life-plan on inherited outlooks and habits-who does not
achieve sufficient distance from his original community either delibe-
rately to make the tradition his own or to transcend it-is not fully
alive.... Nor is it to deny the importance of attachment to groups.
Participation in families, friendships, teams of workers, local political
bodies, communities of faith, and other cooperative ventures is more
than a strategy for achieving our individual ambitions and desires; it
is a crucial way in which we define ourselves. To be most meaningful,
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however, such engagements should derive from choice and commit-
ment, not drift or ascription.212
Since I wrote this passage, two new lines of scholarship
have emerged that provide support for this general approach
but also suggest ways in which it could be refined. 213 The first
is a branch of social psychology known as Self-Determination
Theory. Proponents of this theory, led by Edward Deci and Ri-
chard Ryan, derive from a substantial body of empirical work
some generalizations concerning human nature. People, they
contend, have three innate psychological needs: for competence
(the ability "to have an effect on the environment as well as to
attain valued outcomes within it"); for autonomy (the ability "to
self-organize experience and behavior and to have activity be
concordant with one's integrated sense of self"); and for rela-
tedness (the ability "to feel connected to others-to love and
care, and to be loved and cared for"). 214 The ways in which
people typically seek to satisfy these needs in different societies
vary, but the needs themselves are universal. If jobs or tasks
are structured in ways that enable participants to satisfy these
212. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1746-51 (1988) (citations omitted).
213. In addition to these lines, several individual works have been pub-
lished that explore or defend compatible conceptions of human flourishing.
See, e.g., Andrew Sayer, Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work, 15 RES
PUBLICA 1 (2009). Within legal scholarship, an important example is Yochai
Benkler's Wealth of Networks, which elaborates ideals of autonomy and com-
munity that are fully consistent with the vision offered here-despite Benk-
ler's stubborn insistence on characterizing his outlook as a form of "liberal-
ism." See BENKLER, supra note 80, at chs. 5, 10. An ambitious forthcoming
book by Madhavi Sunder will apply a compatible theory to the law of intellec-
tual property. See Madhavi Sunder, IP: YOUTUBE, MYSPACE, OUR CULTURE
(forthcoming 2010).
214. See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The "What" and "Why" of
Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSY-
CHOL. INQUIRY 227, 231 (2000) (hereinafter Deci & Ryan, What and Why]. The
body of work on which these conclusions are based includes EDWARD L. DECI &
RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HU-
MAN BEHAVIOR (1985); Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Be-
long: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motiva-
tion, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497 (1995); Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The
Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational Processes, in 13 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 39 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1980); Ed-
ward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, A Motivational Approach to Self-Integration
in Personality, 38 PERSP. ON MOTIVATION 237 (1990); Richard M. Ryan &
James P. Connell, Perceived Locus of Causality and Internalization: Examin-
ing Reasons for Acting in Two Domains, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
749 (1989); Kennon M. Sheldon & Andrew J. Elliot, Goal Striving, Need Satis-
faction, and Longitudinal Well-Being: The Self-Concordance Model, 76 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 482 (1999).
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three needs, then the participants develop powerful "intrinsic
motivations" that both sustain their commitments to those
projects and help them succeed. 215 So, for example, people learn
faster, perform sports better, and more effectively resolve
health problems if, in doing so, they are able to address these
three needs. 216 By contrast, "if the social world provides no reli-
able paths that allow fulfillment of these critical needs, and if
people have to stay in situations that consistently block need
satisfaction . . . [Self-Determination Theory] predicts signifi-
cant psychological costs and accommodations. Indeed, the etiol-
ogy of various forms of psychopathology resides primarily in
developmental deprivations concerning basic psychological
needs."2 17 In sum, satisfaction of these needs is essential, Deci,
Ryan and their colleagues conclude, for "ongoing psychological
growth, integrity, and well-being."218
The second line of scholarship is a branch of moral and po-
litical philosophy known as the Capabilities Approach. Pio-
neered by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, this approach
argues that all persons have certain fundamental capabilities
or freedoms that together constitute the "substantial precondi-
tions for a dignified human life." 219 The principal responsibility
of a government is to establish a set of social, economic, and po-
litical conditions that enable persons to realize these capabili-
ties. In Nussbaum's words:
215. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory
and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-
Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 68, 69-71 (2000).
216. See Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Active Human Nature: Self-
Determination Theory and the Promotion and Maintenance of Sport, Exercise,
and Health, in INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN EXERCISE
AND SPORT 1, 2-6, 10-13 (Martin S. Hagger & Nikos L.D. Chatzisarantis eds.,
2007); Hyungshim Jang, Supporting Students' Motivation, Engagement, and
Learning During an Uninteresting Activity, 100 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 798, 806-
08 (2008); Richard M. Ryan et al., Facilitating Health Behaviour Change and
Its Maintenance: Interventions Based on Self-Determination Theory, 10 EUR.
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 2, 2-5 (2008).
217. Deci & Ryan, What and Why, supra note 214, at 248; see also Kennon
M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Understanding the Negative Effects of Le-
gal Education on Law Students: A Longitudinal Test of Self-Determination
Theory, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 883, 884 (2007) ("(Tlhe nega-
tive motivational effects [researchers] demonstrated were likely caused by the
controlling and autonomy-denying features of legal education.").
218. Cf. Note, Designing the Public Domain, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1496-
503 (2009) (using self-determination theory to illuminate competing argu-
ments concerning the proper shape of the public domain).
219. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities: 'Perception"
Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2006).
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At the heart of the (Capabilities Approach] is an idea that it bor-
rows from and shares with most of the world's great religious tradi-
tions: the idea that all human beings are precious, deserving of re-
spect and support, and that the worth of all human beings is equal.
What respect centrally involves, the [Capabilities Approach] holds, is
supporting human beings in the development and exercise of some
central human abilities .... 220
So what are these capabilities? For Sen, they are ultimate-
ly reducible to engagement and choice-"the liberty of acting as
citizens who matter and whose voices count, rather than living
as well-fed, well-clothed, and well-entertained vassals."221
Nussbaum has developed a more detailed and elaborate list:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length;
not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not
worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including repro-
ductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to
be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and domes-
tic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice
in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses,
to imagine, think, and reason-and to do these things in a "truly hu-
man" way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education,
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathemati-
cal and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought
in connection with experiencing and producing works and events of
one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able
to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of ex-
pression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and free-
dom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences
and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people
outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at
their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gra-
titude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development
blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means sup-
porting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in
their development.)
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and
to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This
entails protection for the liberty of conscience and religious obser-
vance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and
show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of
220. Id. at 10.
221. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 288 (1999).
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social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another. (Pro-
tecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute
and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom
of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; be-
ing able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that
of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of
race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation
to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control over One's Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices
that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, pro-
tections of free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; hav-
ing the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; hav-
ing the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being
able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and enter-
ing into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other
workers. 222
The sets of conditions commended by Self-Determination
Theory, by the Capabilities Approach, and by my own vision of
the good life are not identical. But the overlap between them is
striking. On five dimensions, they converge. And all five sug-
gest that user innovation-both of cultural goods and of equip-
ment-is life-fulfilling and merits legal protection.
The first dimension concerns choice. People live well when
they freely choose their projects, big and small. Autonomy in
this sense plainly characterizes the user-innovators. They se-
lect the products to tweak and the ways of tweaking them. But,
admittedly, this observation doesn't get us far. A thousand oth-
er vocations and avocations would involve as many choices.
What's so good about this one?
The second dimension enables us to narrow the field a bit.
A sense of "competence," to use Deci and Ryan's term,223 is cru-
cial to the good life. A recurring theme in accounts of user in-
222. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NA-
TIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 76-78 (2006); see also MARTHA C. NUSS-
BAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-
80 (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT]; Nussbaum, supra
note 219, at 13-16. For a provocative effort to combine Nussbaum's argument
with postmodern critical theory and the "strict constructivist theory of tech-
nology" in a way that illuminates copyright law, see Cohen, supra note 146, at
1159-70, 1183-89.
223. See, e.g., Deci & Ryan, What and Why, supra note 214, at 231.
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novation is that confronting and solving problems, developing
the skills necessary to do so, helps foster justified feelings of
mastery: I know what I am doing. In Nussbaum's words, I am
in "control of [my material] environment."224 I may not own
that environment. (In my view, Nussbaum overstates the im-
portance of property rights to this dimension.) But I can shape
it.
These observations lead naturally to the third value: en-
gagement. A rewarding life, it seems, is active, not passive.
Modern western culture, despite and in part because of the ma-
terial comforts it affords, is hazardous on this score. Its tenden-
cy is to reduce us to (in Sen's words) "well-fed, well-clothed, and
well-entertained vassals" 2 25 or (in George Kateb's words) "so-
cially manufactured, conditioned, manipulated, thing[s]."226 In-
novative activity of the sorts reviewed in this Article can be an
antidote to the poison. When done at work, innovation helps
make that work "meaningful" (in the Marxist sense); the inno-
vator takes control of the tools of her trade and adapts them in
hopes of doing the job better. When done outside of work, it
makes for more active play. In both contexts, the sense of re-
sponsibility for the fruits of one's efforts sharpens the mind,
and heightens the senses of involvement and responsibility. 227
The fourth dimension is self-expression. Most defenders of
freedom to modify cultural goods rightly emphasize this value.
Lessig, for example, offers as the epitome of read-write culture
the moment when his son first suggested an alteration in the
plot of his made-up 'monster man' story. 228 The reason the mo-
ment was so powerful: "What we want to see in our kids is their
224. NUSSBAUM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 222, at 80.
225. SEN, supra note 221, at 288.
226. GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC
CULTURE 90 (1992).
227. Jonathan Zittrain makes a similar point when explaining one of the
benefits of "generative" products:
[T]here is a unique joy to be had in building something, even if one is
not the best craftsperson. This is a value best appreciated by expe-
riencing it; those who demand proof may not be easy to persuade.
Fortunately, there are many ways in which people have a chance to
build and contribute. Many jobs demand intellectual engagement,
which can be fun for its own sake. People take joy in rearing children:
teaching, interacting, guiding. They can also immerse themselves in
artistic invention or software coding.
ZITTRAIN, supra note 106, at 90.
228. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 87.
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will. What we want to inspire is a will that constructs well."229
Most modifications of equipment are equally expressive-and
deserve nourishing for the same reason. People contribute to
online discussions their ideas concerning basketball shoe de-
signs, router jigs, fly-tying patterns and so forth for many rea-
sons, but surely among them is hunger for self-expression. One
of the indicators of that impulse is most contributors' strong
desire for attribution. They almost never ask for money, but
they do want to be given credit when credit is due.
Those same online discussions implicate the fifth and final
dimension. All of the theories recognize participation in freely
chosen communities as crucial to human flourishing. The most
striking aspect of most modern forms of user innovation is the
frequency with which they give rise to, and are fueled by, com-
munities. Typically, the innovative activity itself is solitary, but
the larger social practice it sustains is collective. User-
innovators rarely "bowl alone."2 3 0 This is equally true with re-
spect to cultural goods and with respect to equipment. A few
examples, drawn from disparate settings, should suggest the
importance of these groups:
The ethos of [fan fiction] is one of community, of shared journeys to
understanding and enjoyment. Regardless of literary value, fan fic-
tion is a pleasurable and valuable part of many fans' experiences. The
political importance of fandom stems from sharing secondary crea-
tions. Fans feel that they are making significant life choices when
they share their work with a broader community of like-minded
people.231
Summer is the most popular season for lowriders, as the weather
often encourages being outside either in or nearby the vehicle. Some
lowrider clubs have weekly meetings in the summer where owners
and friends will have a barbecue followed by cruising a popular drag
(or strip) after dark. Aside from local drags and their parking lots, lowrid-
ers are most commonly seen at privately organized lowrider car shows
229. Id. John Palfrey and Urs Gasser make a similar point-and connect it
to a theory of human flourishing:
The vast majority of Digital Natives are dreaming of neither fame
nor fortune when they create online. Often, they simply want to ex-
press themselves, just as human beings have wanted to do since they
first began painting in caves more than 30,000 years ago. The desire
to express one's own beliefs and opinions-to share them with oth-
ers-is central to human nature.
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 35, at 124.
230. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIV-
AL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 506 (2000) (using the term to describe the social
disconnectedness that has come to characterize much of American culture).
231. Tushnet, supra note 24, at 657.
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that often feature a variety of different vehicular and joto non-
vehicular events, the most popular of which are the wet T-shirt/bikini
contests and the hop and dance hydraulic competitions where compet-
itors compete against each other to see who can hop the highest or
complete a list of moves within a time limit (dancing).232
The vision of cycling promoted by ["do-it-yourself"] cycling coun-
terculture participants such as Ballantine, Burrows, and others takes
a holistic approach that celebrates all forms of cycling and opposes
narrower views (such as the hostility to mountain bikes found in more
traditional cycling circles). These members of the cycling countercul-
ture are especially committed to commuter cycling as an alternative
to motorized traffic, and this has resulted both in a conscious search
for practical designs that can overcome the limitations of established
models and in a championing of wider transport campaigning issues,
both of these accomplished through the pages of a succession of small-
run magazines . ... There is a clear desire here to raise the status of
cycling in Britain closer to that seen in northern European countries
such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany. This is accompa-
nied by a sense of belonging to a cycling community, and a belief in
the need for some degree of collective action to bring this about-
something that contrasts perhaps with the individualism of some
sports cycling.233
The bonds shared by router-jig designers, real-person slash
writers, kite-surfers, and so forth take different forms, but are
equally strong.
In short, on five related dimensions-autonomy, compe-
tence, engagement, self-expression, and community-user in-
novation offers opportunities for self-fulfillment. The argument
should not be overstated. The activity of modifying mass-
produced products is plainly not the only way in which one can
live a good life. There exist many other ways of satisfying the
fundamental needs outlined above. Active citizenship of the
sort celebrated by the advocates of classical republicanism 234
and engagement in meaningful work of the sort celebrated by
Marxist scholarS235 come immediately to mind. Nor, surely, is
freedom to modify either cultural goods or equipment sufficient
232. Absolute Astronomy, Lowriders, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/
topics/Lowrider (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
233. Rosen, supra note 117, at 382.
234. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1494-
99 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 68-85 (1985).
235. See supra text accompanying note 212. A recent survey suggests that,
in the United States, access to meaningful work is diminishing. See Press Re-
lease, The Conference Board, U.S. Job Satisfaction at Lowest Level in Two




to support a good life. But, for a growing number of people, it
offers one important component. If, as Sen and Nussbaum ar-
gue, the principal responsibility of the state is to create condi-
tions that provide people access to rewarding lives, then it
seems that we ought to adjust the legal system to increase the
ability of people to engage in activities of the sorts addressed in
this Article.
But is legal reform really necessary? At the end Part V.B.1,
we observed that the efficiency-based argument for affording
greater latitude for user innovation was weakened by the ab-
sence of a clear theory of market failure-an explanation for
why manufacturers and users would not voluntarily agree to
arrangements that permitted the latter (for a fee) to tinker
freely. Is not the argument based on human flourishing vulner-
able to the same objection? Perhaps. But the premises of the
two approaches are different. The efficiency argument is tied to
the principle of consumer sovereignty, which takes as given
people's current preferences for goods, services, and states of
affairs. Poetry is no better than push-pin;236 an active life is no
better than a passive one. The theory of human flourishing is
not so confined. Rather, it asserts that, in combination, a
stunted educational system and the process of cognitive disson-
ance have caused many people to develop a durable set of ha-
bits, expectations, and desires that cause them to prefer lives
less fulfilling than the one sketched above. 237 The implication
for the topic before us: the set of consumers hungry for oppor-
tunities to innovate, large as it is, is nevertheless smaller than
it should be. Too many of us prefer the reliability of an iPhone
or TiVo to the flexibility of a Droid. The government, through
law, should therefore strive to open more opportunities for user
innovation than manufacturers and the current population of
users, left to their own devices, would create. 238
236. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD 206 (1825).
237. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, PRACTIcAL REASON 26-27 (1994) (discuss-
ing this phenomenon in the context of education); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES:
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109 (1983) ("[Why should indi-
vidual want satisfaction be the criterion of justice and social choice when indi-
vidual wants themselves may be shaped by a process that preempts the
choice?"); Sayer, supra note 213, at 11-12; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1135, 1138-39, 1146-50
(1986).
238. For the theory of paternalism upon which any assertion of this sort




Let's take stock. With respect to conflicts involving modifi-
cations of mass-produced products, we have identified three po-
tential arguments for the producers and three potential mar-
kets for the user-innovators. Some have more bite when applied
to modifications of cultural goods; others have more bite when




Efficiency highly context specific highly context specific
(incentives)
Labor-Desert Moderate in some con- Moderate in some con-
Theory texts; weak in others texts; weak in others




Economic Strong in some con- Weak
Efficiency texts; weak in others
(market
failures)
Distributive Strong in some con- Weak in most contexts




How should a lawmaker-whether a legislator considering
a new rule or a judge construing an existing one-respond to
this pattern? The answer is far from obvious. Not only are the
weights of some of the arguments very difficult to measure, but
several are incommensurable. Specifically, the arguments
listed in the first layer of each chart could be combined into a
single calculus of the overall impact on social welfare of each
type of innovation, but the others cannot be integrated in that
way. The lawmaker would thus be forced to compare apples to
oranges.
In the face of these difficulties, one's temptation may be to
throw up one's hands. Another instance of radical indetermina-
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cy, it seems. But the lawmaker does not have this luxury. She
must decide. How?
Two alternative strategies suggest themselves. A lawmak-
er skeptical of the argument that seeks to derive wisdom from a
substantive theory of human flourishing is likely to observe
that all of the other arguments, both for and against user inno-
vation, are either weak or vary radically by context. That ob-
servation would, in turn, point toward a strategy of disaggrega-
tion. Don't attempt to resolve broadly the question of the
legitimacy of user innovation. Rather, select rules-like the fair
use doctrine in copyright law-that require close attention to
the facts and circumstances of each case. Doctrines of that sort
would enable-could even require-the judges and juries who
administer them to assess the force of each of the considera-
tions we have identified when applied to the particular type of
product and the particular form of user innovation at issue.
This approach would have the familiar advantages of flexibility
and potential precision in the pursuit of social goals and the
familiar disadvantages of unpredictability and expense.
A lawmaker who embraces the substantive theory of hu-
man flourishing would likely react very differently. Taking into
account the strong endorsement that theory provides for user
innovations of all sorts and the weakness or variability of all of
the other arguments, she would likely look for broad rules that
expanded the freedom enjoyed by innovators.
Let's assume, optimistically, that she selects the second
path. What adjustments of current doctrines might she make?
Here are a few:
(1) Increase the weight given, when administering the fair
use doctrine, to the question of how "transformative" was the
defendant's activity. To be more precise, she might define the
term, "transformative use," expansively-to mean any use of
copyrighted material that either constitutes or facilitates crea-
tive engagement with intellectual productS239-and then ele-
vate the importance of such a finding in the fair use calculus.
Such an approach would focus on the process by which the de-
fendant's work was produced, rather than (as is now customa-
239. See id. at 1768. But cf. Cohen, supra note 146, at 1203-04 (arguing
that we should abandon the fair use framework altogether and instead narrow
a copyright owner's exclusive right to prepare derivative works so as to ex-
clude from its ambit (a) noncommercial fan fiction and (b) commercial sequels
that do not "continu[e] the narrative voice established by the original").
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ry) the relationship between the defendant's work and the
plaintiff's. 240
(2) Interpret the first sale doctrines (as they arise in copy-
right, patent, and trademark law) more expansively. This ap-
proach would both increase the freedom of purchasers of prod-
ucts to modify the objects they now own and, as Pamela
Samuelson persuasively suggests, would better align the law
with public attitudes, in which the notion that you should be
able to do what you want with something you have paid for is
nearly universal.
(3) Interpret the First Amendment to insulate from liabili-
ty expressive forms of user innovation, whether they involve
cultural goods or equipment.241
(4) Add to the U.S. patent statute an exemption for non-
commercial activities involving patented products and
processes similar to the provisions that can be found in the pat-
ent statutes of Germany and the United Kingdom. 242
(5) Modify the distinction between "repair" and "recon-
struction" of patented items, so that more forms of user innova-
tion fall into the first of these baskets. 2 4 3
(6) Modify the doctrines of unconscionability and preemp-
tion so as to invalidate contractual provisions that either (a)
240. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("The
central purpose of this investigation is to see . .. whether the new work merely
supersedes the objects of the original creation . . . or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character. . . ." (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
241. For arguments along these lines in the context of cultural goods, see
NETANEL, supra note 202, at 190-93; Balkin, supra note 202, at 43-54; cf.
Note, "Recoding" and the Derivative Works Entitlement: Addressing the First
Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488, 1506-09 (2006) (advocating
adoption of a "cultural saturation exception to the right to control derivative
works" in order to reconcile First Amendment concerns and the general objec-
tives of copyright law).
242. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, legal gazette as
amended, § 11(2) (Germany), available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/en/text
html.jsp?lang-en&id=984 ("The effect of a patent shall not extend to ... acts
done privately and for non-commercial purposes."); Patents Act, 1977, as
amended, c. 37, § 60(5)(a) (Eng.), available at http://www.wipo.int/clealen/text
pdf.jsp?lang-EN&id=1720 (stating that an activity that otherwise "would con-
stitute an infringement of a patent for an invention shall not do so if ... it is
done privately and for purposes which are not commercial"). For the argument
that the Japanese patent system tacitly recognizes a similar exemption, see
Talha Syed, Research Exemptions to Patent Rights: Law and Policy in Four
Jurisdictions (The U.S., Germany, Japan & the U.K.) 46-47 (2010) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author).
243. See Strandburg, supra note 36, at 494-95.
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specify that any alteration of a consumer product, regardless of
its actual impact on the functionality of the product, voids the
warranty or (b) seek to limit the freedom that purchasers would
enjoy under the fair use and first sale doctrines. 244
(7) Amend the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to exempt
either: (a) circumvention of technologies that control "access to
a copyrighted work," when the principal purpose of that cir-
cumvention is to enable the circumventer to modify the under-
lying product; or (more broadly) (b) circumvention (for any pur-
pose) of encryption systems that do not incorporate
mechanisms to accommodate the traditional exceptions to copy-
right protection, such as the fair use doctrine. 245
(8) Last but not least, with respect to audio and video re-
cordings distributed in digital forms, replace the copyright re-
gime by which the creators of such recordings currently are
compensated with an alternative compensation system, under
which the creators are periodically paid, out of a government
fund, sums proportional to the relative frequency with which
their works are watched or listened to.24 6 Because such a
reform would have the effect of legalizing the preparation of de-
rivative works based upon the recordings (as well as the verba-
tim copying and redistribution of recordings), it would create
the most generous of the safe harbors for user-innovators.
CONCLUSION
In the past two decades, conflict between the producers of
cultural goods and the people who wish to modify those goods
has generated a spate of litigation and a corresponding body of
legal scholarship discussing whether the interests of the pro-
ducers or the interests of the users should take precedence. A
similar conflict is now intensifying between producers of
equipment who wish to prevent or control modifications of their
products and a growing group of users who wish to defy those
restrictions. This Article offers a critical review of the policy ar-
guments that have been deployed in the first setting and then
244. Cf. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122
(2008) (limiting in other respects the capacity of sellers of patented materials
to use contractual provisions to narrow the scope of the first sale doctrine).
245. See FISHER, supra note 22, at 153; Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair
Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41,
54-70 (2001).
246. See FISHER, supra note 22, at ch. 6; Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncom-
mercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 35-59 (2003).
1476 [94:1417
2010] USER INNOVATION 1477
assesses the potential force of each of those arguments in the
second setting. Most of the arguments, on both sides, prove ei-
ther to be weak or to vary radically by context. One argument,
however, proves powerful and broad, both as applied to cultural
goods and as applied to equipment: user innovation is condu-
cive to human flourishing. For that reason, the law ought to af-
ford users the room they need.
